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Wages are commonly assumed to be exogenously determined in
socialisteconomies  But wages in socialisteconomies have been
determined  by a combination of  institutional  and economic
factors.
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The  inefficiencies  particular  to  socialist  economies  have  generally  been
traced  to  the  absence  of  market  based  discipline  and  most  especially,  the  weights
given to full  employment,  price  stability  and low income  dispersion.  The
resulting  trade-off  was historically  presented  in terms of systemic  or
macroeconomic  rationality  alongside  microeconomic  inefficiency  1.  Yet
increasingly  this  distinction  has  appeared  irrelevant.  In  some  instances,  the
extent  of  underlying  macroeconomic  imbalance  was  masked  by recourse  to  heavy
external  borrowing  and/or  accompanied  by  attempts  at  piecemeal  economic  reform
aimed  at  eliminating  or  reducing  those  imbalances.  In  general,  the  symptom  of
tension  was  the  presence  of  acute  goods  market  shortages  associated  with  an
excess  demand  regime.  Less  well  perceived  was  the  link  between  goods  markets
disequilibria  and the demand  for factors  of production. Guaranteed  full
employment  imposed  excess  demand  for labour  regimes  generating  some  labour
hoarding  by enterprises  2.  Such  hoarding  could  readily  coexist  with  labour
shortages  and  indeed  could  exacerbate  such  shortages.
Clearly,  persistent  excess  demand  for  labour  and  capital  would  appear  to
rule  out  any  of  the  behavioural  relations,  even  correlation,  between  standard
macroeconomic  variables.  Thus,  even  the  tendency  toward  wage  expansion  that
might  be  presumed  to  exist  when  labour  reserves  are  exhausted  might  be  absent  in
the  institutional  setting  of  the  classical  socialist  economy.  Inflation  could
in  principle  be  eliminated  by  an  ex  ante  balancing  of  incomes  and  expenditures.
An inability  to  balance  revenues  and  expenditures  could  be expressed  as  open
inflation  but equally  as repressed  inflation  or simply  be denied --  hidden
inflation  <.  The restrictions  on the  functioning  of a labour  market  then
dissociate  the  maintenance  of  full  employment  through  changes  in  the  real  wage,
imply  further  that  labour  allocation  and  sorting  occurs  independently  of  standard
signals  and that with low wage dispersion  a  conventional  intertemporal
accumulation  of  skills  does  not  occur.
It  is  now  evident  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight  that  the  coordination  of
economic  policies  in a  centrally  planned  system  proved  consistently  more
difticult  than  anticipated.  Incomes  policies  proved  only  partially  effective  as
a  balancing  mechanism  with  relatively  rapid  growth  in  open  inflation  in  a  numbe;
of  economies,  particularly  those  undertaking  partial  market-oriented  reforms.
On the  real  side  of the  economy  performance  was  very  mixed  with  apparently
adverse  dynamic  outcomes. Table  1.1  demonstrates  negative  growth  rates  of
capital  productivity  for  the  entire  sample  from  the  mid-1970s  onwards. In
addition,  growth  rates  for  labour  productivity  decelerated  very  significantly  and
universally  from  the  early  1970s  onwards.
These  adverse  dynamics  have  commonly  been  attributed  to  the  inappropriate
I  Nuti  (1988)
2  Bauer  (1990);  Kornai  (1985)
3  Portes  (1977)-2-
incentive  structure  operating  in  the  system  with  emphasis-on  the  lack  of  private
r-  turns  to  effort. 'The  incentive  problem  was  widely  recognized  by planners  and
Table  1.1
Labour  and  Capital  Productivity  (average  annual  growth  rates),  1966-85
1966-70  1971-75  1976-80  1981-85
Lab Cap  Lab  Cap  Lab  Cap  Lab  Cap
Bulgaria  8.1 n.a  6.2 -0.6  4.4 -3.6  3.5  -3.1
Czechoslovakia  5.5  n.a  5.9  1.1  3.7  -1.5  1.3 -3.4
GDR  5.0 n.a  6.2  0.1  4.4  -1.0  4.3  -0.4
Hungary  5.1  n.a  6.1  -1.5  4.5  -4.3  2.3  -3.1
Poland  4.0  n.a  7.3  1.0  4.3  -4.2  -0.1  -3.4
Romania  7.3  n.a  6.2  -0.3  5.8  -0.8  4.0  -4.2
USSR  6.3  n.a  5.8  -1.1  2.8  -2.9  3.1  -2.7
Source:  ECE-UN;  cited  in  Nuti  (1988),  p367
academics  in  socialist  economies.  While  high  material  intensity,  low  quality
capital  goods  and  inflexible  allocative  mechanisms  can  explain  part  of  this  poor
performance,  the  institutional  framework,  motivational  structure  and remuneration
system  are  clearly  central  to  explaining  low  productivity  in  the  state  sector.
At  the  same  time,  the  attentuation  of  private  ownership  and  thet  reward  structure
would  exacerbate  problems --  familiar  also to a capitalist  economy --  in
monitoring  performance  and information  asymmetry.  Among  other  results,  the
absence  of a  conventional  disciplinary  mechanism  --  su.:h  as  involuntary
unemployment  --  might  be expected  to facilitate  shirking.
Despite  widespread  recognition  that the lack of  a  conventional
macroeconomic  equilibrating  mechanism  in  the  system  and  the  commitment  to  low
wage  dispersion  has  tended  to  dilute  productivity  growth,  exacerbate  wage
pressures  and been  a component  in  the  determination  of  the  level  of  excess  demand
in  the  system,  limited  attention  has  been  directed  to  the  particular  processes
by  which  wages  are  determined  in  such  economies.  One assumption  has  been  to  view
wages  as largely  exogenous. Yet --  as this  paper  attempts  to show --  this is
not  appropriate  once  consideration  of the  incentive  parameters  is taken  into
account.  We  also  aim  explicitly  to  introduce  incentive  features  particu.lar  to
a  variety  of  socialist  regimes  where  account  is  taken  of  the  degree  of  ma-ket-
oriented  reforms  introduced  into  the  system  '.
This  paper  focusses  on  the  issue  of  wage  determination  starting  from  the
case  of  a  classical  centrally  planned  economy  and  then  progressively  introducing
4  It  should,  of  course,  be  mentioned  that  there  is  an  extensive  literature
on the  Yugoslav  experience  with  worker  management/councils  and more  exotic
ownership  forms;  see,  inter  alia,  Ward  (1958);  Tyson  (1979);  Horvat  (1986);  Jones
and  Svejnar  (1988).  This  paper  explicitly  does  not  concern  itself  wit)  the
Yugoslav  case.-3-
market  directed  reforms.  While such regime  shifts  have obviously  to be
attributed  to  range  of  factors,  we  attempt  to  show  that  such  reforms  generally
represent  attempts  at  changing  the  incentive  and  monitoring  structure  and  hence
involve  significant  changes  to  the  process  by  which  wages  are  generated.  We
approach  the  problem  in  a  simple  game  theoretic  framework  and  hence  with  regard
to  the  compatibility  of  interests  among  agents  in  these  regimes.  We  relate  the
wuge  outcome  to  games  involving,  variously,  workers,  managers  and  the  planner.
The  players  in  these  games  differ  by  regime,  as  do  the  outcomes  of  the  gamea.
An underlying  concern  of the  paper  is  basically  macroeconobaic  as  we wish  to
extract  a  set  of  strictura.  wage  equations  that  could  be  cast  in  a  macroeconomic
model. We  further  attempt  to  derive  observable  specifications.  However,  the
paper  attempts  to ground  these  equations  by providing  some simple  micro-
foundations  appropriate  to  the  institutional  and  other  arrangements
characterizing  the  socialist  economy.
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  a  brief
dis,ussion  of  the  institutional  context  in  which  wages  and  employment  have  been
determined  in  socialist  economies.  A simple  typology  of  regimes  is  presented
that attempts  to accomodate  the features  of the various  reform  measures
undertaken  in a range  of socialist  economies  over the past twenty  years.
Sections  3 through  5 set  up  simple  bargaining  models  feor  the  various  regimes.
In  Section  6,  drawing  on  Hungarian  and  Polish  experience  and  data,  we  present
some  preliminary  estimations  of  our  wage  equations  and  Section  7  concludes.
Section  2:  Wage  Determination  in  the  Socialist  Economy
2.1  Regime  Typology
Tne  discussion  that  follows  aims  to  provide  summary  treatment  of :he  key
features  of  a  range  of  socialist  economy  regimes  with  particular  regard  to  the
wage  determinati3n.  Clearly  many  particularities  are  glossed  over  or  ignored;
the  objective  is  to  encapsulate  the  basic  regularities  of  the  stylized  regimes
with  which  we intend  to  work. The  characteristics  of  the  regimes  are  crudely
classified  in  Table  2.1. We  distinguish  four  discrete  regimes  --  the  classical
centrally-planned  economy  (CPE),  the  partially  reformed  socialist  economy  in  a
first  phase  (RME),  a reformed  socialist  economy  in  its  second  phase  (R2E)  and
a standard  capitalist  economy  (CE). No strict  linearity  is  implied  by the
classification  which  is  more  aormative  than  theoretical.  Rather,  the  typology
broadly  captures  a series  of  historical  experiences  among  European  socialist
economies. In general,  however,  the transformation  has followed  a linear
process.  Movement  away  from  the  CPE  has  involved  a  transition  to  an  economy  with
RlE features.  Hungary  after  1968  and  Poland  from  the  early  1970s  might  be
considered  as RlE economies. Advanced  reform  regimes  (R2E)  with features
increasingly  akin  to those  of  a standard  capitalist  economy  have  been  a  more
recent  feature  (for  example  Poland  and  GDR  in  1990).  The  majority  of  countries
remain  effectively  located  in  RlE  regimes.
For  the  purposes  at  hand,  the  distinction  between  the  latter  and  the  CPE
relates  to  the  change  in  the  rules  determining  wage  fixing;  the  introduction  of
new  actors  --  namely  managers  --  into  the  wage  bargaining  framework  and the-4-
Table  2.1
CPE  ...  RIE  R2E  ...  CE
1.  Ownership  of enterprises  state owned  state owned  primarily  largely  private
state  owned
2.  Allocatio,  of  plan  plan/free  free  frga
production  inputs
3.  Setting  of  plan  plan/free  market  "riWt
factor  prices
4.  Allocation  of  plan  plan/free  free  free
labor  Lnput
5. Setting  of  wages  plan  free/rules  markec  / wage  market
taxation
6.  Allocation  of  plan  plan/free  free  froe
consumer  goods
7.  Setting  of  plan  plan/free  market  market
consumer  prices
S. FLros.  soft  soft  soft/hard  hard
budget  constraint
9.  Unemployment  goal  no  no  accepts  accepts
unemploymene  unemployment  unrnployment  unemploymenc
10.  Tax policy  turn over tax  turn-over  tax  incoms  tax,  income  tax,
profit  taxed  VAT  VAT
11.  Sub#idled  often  often  re-ove  few
significant  significant
12.  Government *  soft/hard  soft/hard  soft/hard  soft/hard
budget  constraint
13.  Monetary  policy  passive  rassive  contingent  concingent
14. Separate  central  bank  no  no/yes  to  some  yea
and retail  banks  extent
15.  Ownership  of  state  state  seate  private
reeas1  banks
16.  Retail  banks'  soft  soft  soft/hard  hard  I
budget  constraint
17. securLties  markets  no  no  no  yes
16. foreign  trade  state  state  +  free  free
monopoly  enterprises
19. Exchange  rate  policy  fixed,  fixed,  fixed/flexible  fixed/flexible
rationed  rationed
20.  Convertibility  no  no  yes (current  yes
account)general  shift  in planner's  preference  toward  goals  not strictly  denominated  in
quantity  terms. However,  no parametric  shift  occurs  with regard  to  employment;
nor  with  regard  to  the  budgec  constraint  facing  enterprises.  In  short,  the  RlE
stage represents  sele-tive  market-oriented  reforms  with prices  still largely
administratively  determined  and resource  allocation  driven  by the planner  or
central  authority.  To  t'."Xt  extent,  both  x  7orm  economies  (RlE  and  R2E)  represent
degrees  of decentralizacion  with respect  so  the  base CPE  structure. While  the
R2E economy bears most of the characteUistics  of a capitalisr  regime, the
thinness  of  financial  institutions  and  the  ownership  structure  continue  to  create
an  effective  distinction.  Retention  of  the  soft  budget  cons  traint  has  potentially
powerful  implications  for  the  wage  bargain.
2.2  The Centrally  Planned  Economy  (CPE)
The  CPE  that  was  the  characteristic  organizational  form  for  most  socialist
regin;ss  until the 1970s (and in some cases  --  such as Bulgaria,  Romania  and
Soviet  Union --  until  almost  the  present  day)  was based  on vertical  controls,
with the planner coordinating  economic  decisions.  Enterprise  autonomy  was
severely  circumscribed  and  management  was  largely  a  transmission  belt  for  orders
emanating  from the  planner. Trade  unions  lacked  autonomy  and full employment
was  a  given. Commands  issued  to agents  and  monitored  essentially  in  quantities
proceeded  on the basis  of a theoretical  balancing  of input  and output  flows.
Similarly, revenues and  expenditures  were balanced with  financial flows
accomodating  planned  physical  flows. Wages  were  commonly  set  at low  levels  and
were  compressed  in their  dispersion.  A significant  wedge  between  direct  lrbour
costs  to  enterprises  and  household  income  emerged  given  the  weight  of transiers
and subsidies  in total  income. This  generally  implied  low  absolute  wages  but
relatively  high  aggregate  household  income. Wages  were consistently  subject  to
centralized  controls.  These were critical for achieving balance between
aggregate  revenues  and expenditures  as also for restraining  the tendency  for
labour  market  rents  to  be  extracted  out  of  a  system  where  conventional  ownership
and  market  disciplines  were absent.
Several  well-recognised  tensions  emerged  from  this system.  In dynamic  terms,
once labour  reserves  have been exhausted,  the  mechanism  for  output  growth  was
necessarily  greater  capital  infusions. Growth  depended  on new investment  with
higher  capital-labour  ratios  and/or  changing  the  product-mix  toward  more  capital.
intensive  goods.  Depending  on the income  elasti  'r  of consumer  demand  for
capital  and  labour-intensive  goods,  satisfying  consum.L  demand  could  have  adverse
consequences  for growth.  By the same token, this could yield exaggerated
mismatch  between  consumer  demand  and  the  structure  of aggregate  output  °. This
dynamic  inefficiency  reached  down  into  the  wage  process. When labour  shortages
emerged  and  the  penalty  that  could  be exacted  by the  planner  from  the  worker  for
inadequate  effort  was  absent  or  difficult  to  enforce,  the  only  feasible  mechanism
for  inducing  greater  worker  effort  remained  piece-rate  wage  adjustment.  The  use
of piece-rates  attempted  to  get round  the  monitoring  problem. The  issue  turned
not  only  on  the  costs  of  monitoring  individual  effort  but  also,  given  the  absence
One implication  of this being  that  any shift  in prefe,ence  on the  part
of the  planner  toward  satisfying  consumer  demand  would  have a correspondingly
negative  effect  on output;  see  Weitzmann  (1970).-6
of  a  true  management  agency,  in  monitoring  enterprise  performance.  To the  extent
that an information  constraint  emerged,  the planner  would tend to select  a
control  4.nstrument  that,  in  principle,  harmonized  with the  overall  emphasis  on
physical  --  hence monitorable  -- targets. This  meant that regulation  of the
wage-bill  of  enterprises  became  the  other  key  control  mechanism  in  the  hands  of
the  planner  6.  The enterprise  wage-bill  was in effect  constructed  as  a  base
wage  with  a piece-rate  adjustment  7.
The  use  of above-ncrm  payments  as  motivational  devices  became  a  widespread
feature  of  CPEs. By 1960  90-95%  of  Soviet  industriel  workers  were  paid  some  sort
of incentive  wage and over 60%  were on piece-r.tes  8,  However,  to the  extent
that  piece-rates  resulted  in  aggregate  demand  effects,  the  likely  consequence  was
a further  divergence  of the  planned  supply  of consumption  goods  from notional
demand,  given  limitations  on factor  substitutions  and  the  higher  c&pital/labour
ratios  in production  required  to sustain  growth.  Shortage  moreover  induces
observable  spillover  effects in consumer  markets  9.  To the extent that the
leisure  choices  of workers are constrained  1',  rising  excess  demand (assuming
that  wage  payments  were  not  matched  by  availability  of  consumer  goods),  mirroild
in higher  than  desired  money balances,  would exert  influence  on the relative
effort  applied  by workers.
In short, the full employment  regime imposed  a  weak incentive  base.
Attempts  to raise  X-efficiency  by piece-rate  payments  further  tended  to have
implications  for balance In goods markets.  Combined  with the tendency  fot
exhaustion  of labour  reserves  to promote  a  structure  of output-  that  worsen.d
consumer  goods  market  disequilibria,  this  restrained  the  viability  of sustair  d"
use of  piece-rstes  to  motivate  workers.
2.3  The Partially  Reformed  Economy  (RIE)
Characteristically,  reforms to  the  CPE  emphasized some measure of
decentralization  of  decision-making;  the  underlying  objective  being  to  simulate
some  of the  motivational  features  of a  market  economy  while  retaining  the  basic
ownership  structure  and  redistributive  traits  of socialism.  Generally,  greater
autonomy  for  enterprises  was  accompanied  by measures  to  associate  domestic  with
6  CPEs generally  started  out by regulating  the average  wage but fairly
rapidly  moved  to regulation  of the  wage-bill.
7  A wide variety  of systems  were tried  at various  stages;  most aimed  at
improving  the  incentive  structure  and/or  providing  enterprises  with stimuli  to
reduce  labour  absorption.  In general,  the  wage-bill  was defined  as paid-out
wages  and  bonuses. In  the  late  1960s,  separate  bonus  funds  were  established;  see
Adam (1979)  ppxviii/xix.
8  Kirsch  (1972),  pp41/42
9  See,  for  example,  Podkaminer  (1988)
10 Simply  'exiting' from work  has  generally not  been  feasible, as
legislation  against  'parasitism'  suggests..7
interv-ational  pr'?Jes,  to  allow,  in  some  caszs,  enterprises  to  have  ditect  accers
to  technology  and  other  imports  "  and  by  greater  tolerance  for  unofficial  or
parallel  markets  in  both  goods  and  currency.  Such  measures  were  very  tentatively
initiated  (but  then  reversed)  in  Poland  and  Czerhoslovakia  in  the  late  1950s  and
more  systematically  in  Hungary  after  1968  and  Pcland  after  1.973/75.
Decentralization  involved  the  central  authorities  relinquishing  the  right
to set physical  output  targets and centrally  allocate  inputs and materials.
Given  concentration  and market  power,  supervisory  agencies  were generally
retained  with  a  view  to  containi.,g  price  expansion  by  monopolists.  This  also
cohered  with  the  discretionary  realloc-ation  of  resources  by means  of the  tax
system,  subsidies  and  refinancing  credits  issued  through  the  Central  Bank.
Despite  specific  country  features,  certain  regularities  can  be isolated.
In general,  devolution  of controls  implied  some  measure  of worker  self-
management,  normally  through  enterprise  councils  or partially  accountable
entitier.  In  Poland  by  the  early  1980s  workers'  councils  had  been  established
in  over  6000  enterprises  while  in  Hungary  later  measures  resulted  in  around  73%
of  state  enterprises  being  transformed  to  management  by  councils  2.  From  the
perspective  of  this  paper,  this  transition  implies,  first,  the  possible  creation
of  a new  player  in  the  game  linking  plant  to  planner.  Under  the  partially
reformed  system  a  diluted  managerial  role  emerged,  given  the  weakening  of  planned
outputs  and  allocations.  This  generated  a  more  complex  set  of games  between
enterprise  and  planner  covering  subsidy,  tax  eligibility  and  other  negotiable
arrangements;  it  also  generated  the  potential  for  firm-specific  bargaining.
Decentralization  also raised  the issue  of the  manager's  function  and
motivation.  Clearly,  in  a market  economy,  with  a division  between  owner  and
manager,  motivation  depends  variously  on  labour  market  rewards,  earnings  based
incentives,  share  or stock  options  and any discipline  exerted  by external
valuation  on  the  viability  or  independenc  if  the  enterprise.  rhese  incentives
are largely  absent  in the  RlE.  In fact,  the  only  consistent  motivational
mechanism  has  been  wage  and  performance-related  bonus  payments;  themselves  in
part  constrained  by the  political  acceptability  of  wider  income  dispersion  ".
Further,  precisely  because  of  the  horizons  generatee  by the  system  of social
ownership,  the need to regulate  the size of the incentive  payments  was
recognized.  In general,  the  wage premia  paid  to enterprise  managers  was
explicitl'  associated  with  performance  or  synthetic  indicators  with  penalties
levied  if  wage  expansion  Was in  excess  of  the  growth  in  the  performance
" With  commonly  disastrous  consequences  involving  later  socialization  of
the debts incurred  by  unsatisfactorily  regulated  enterprise  borrowing,
particularly  in  Poland.
12 However,  central  and  party  interference  in  the  composition  of  management
committees  remained  widespread.  For  a  summary  of  the  inst  :utioa%l  changes,  see
IMF  (1989a  and  1989b).
13 Political  opposition  to  wage  differentiation  was  one  main  reason  for  the
failure  of  the  1969  reforms  in  Hungary;  see  Soos  (1987).indicator  14.  The  same  basic  tension  existed  for  managers  as  for  workers  with
respect  to the  possible  appropriation  of labour  rents. Hence,  :he  external
imposition  of  wage  and  bonus  norms  on  both  mana3ers  and  workers.  To  that  extort,
as we  make  explicit  in Section  4, the  manager  and  workers'  interests  might
coincide,  allowing  them  to  act  coope.^atively  against  the  planner.
Decentralization  in  RlE  systems  has  normally  been  linked  to  some  form  of
tax-based  incomes  policy  or  method  of  wage  regulation  imposed  on the  enterprise.
The  exact  design  of  svch  systems  has  varied  widely,  acting  on  either  the  wage
bill  --  the  sum  of  enterprise  wages and  bonuses  --  or  the  rate  of  wage  growth
with  wages  related  to  some  measure  of  performance.  The  frequency  of changes  to
the  system  suggests  the difficulty in isolating  the appropriate  synthetic
measures  '.  Tax-based  incomes  policies  (TIP)  were in principle  designed  to
achieve  several  objectives. )'ir3t,  to restrain  appropriation  of labour  rents;
second,  to  regulav..e  effective  demand  and  goods  market  imbalances  and,  third,  to
regulate  enterprise  demand  for  labour  and  to  achieve  a  moLe  efficient  allocation
of labour  within  the  full  employment  constraint. The  actual  design  o' the  TIP
would  then  in  part  depend  on the  relative  weights  attache;'  to  these  objectives.
Giving  priority  to regulating  enterprise  labour  demand,  for  example,  generally
implied  control  of the  wag,  'ill.
The complexities  in the design  of wage controls  are explored  in detail
elsewhere "'.  Several consistent, *nderlying tersions in  the  approach
characteristic  of RlE  regimes can  be  isolated from a  raige of  country
experiences.
*  Associating  the wage path to that given by productivity  proved
problematic  given  the  set  of  price  distortions  and  offsetting  taxes  and  subsidies
that  remained  in  the  system. Sound  indicators  of  financial  performance  were  not
transparent,  necessitating  frequent  adjustments  to  wage  control  parameters.
*  To the  extent  that  wage formation  was  solidaristic  and  wage increases
converged  to  the  upper  limits,  the  outcome  would  be  an  acceleration  in inflation
given  the  diluted  discipline  exerted  on tradables  prices  by  international  prices.
Equally,  inflation  could  be repressed  via  price  controls.
a  Reliance  on plant-level  productivity  adjustment  had  the obvious
disadvantage  that it  could  pull apart the  wage  distribution  across  industries
on the  basis of no sound  indicator;  given  the structure  of distorted  prices.
A preferable  approach  in  any  event  would  have  been  to  link  labour  cost  increasas
to  economy-wide  productivity  expansion.
"  Such premia could amount  --  as in Hungary  --  to as much as 50% of the
total  wage;  IMF (1989a).
"  Between 1968 and 1989, there were seven major changes in the wage
regulatory  system  in  Hungary  while in  Poland  there  were  six  s  bstantive  changes
in  wage regulatior  betwen  1981  and 1989.
'6  See,  for  example,  Adam (1979)  and (1982);  Granick  (1987);  Marrese  (1981);
IMF (1989a  and 1989b)-9-
*  Using  the  wage  bill  to  regulate  labot demand  would  only  f-end  to  change
the  intra-firm  ski.ll  composition  --  with  a  resulting  bias  toward  unskilled,  lower
wage categot:ies  --  and hence have an impact  on replacement  policy.  Little
efficiency  gain  might  then  be expected.
*  Without  basi"  political  acceptance  of expanded  wage differentials,
policies  aimed  at using  wage diffentials  as a motivational  device  have tended
to fail.  Solidaristic  wage outcomes  likewise  counter  any presumed  incentive
outcome. If  decentralization  proceeds  alongside  greater  tolerance  of  the  private
or parallel  saczor,  effo:t  will be redirected  to uncontrolled  activities  with
adverse  productivity  implications  for the  socialist  sector.
*  Soft budget  constraints  for enterprise  managers  and short-run  wage
maximization  objectives  on  the  part  of  workers  would  tend  to  cluster  wage  demands
at the  upper limits  of the  permissible  payment  irrespective  of performance.
*  Any incentive  effects  intended  to  be  arsociated  with  productivitv  and
skill  related  adjustments  would tend to  be diluted  by a falling  or low  w 
of wages  to total  earnings  t.
*  The effecti-_vness  of any tax-based  incomes  approach  depends  on the
ability to enforce the penalties  t8.  To the extent that such 'control-by-
consjnt'  is absent.  more complex  bargaining  will emerge. This appears  to fit
tba  Polish  RlE  experience  since  the  late  1970s. The  outcome  is  accelerated  wage
drift  and the inefficacy  of wage  controls  as  a  tool  for  demand  management.
*  Ther:e  is an inevitable  tension  batween using wage controls  for
macroeconomic objectives --  particularly  excess demand in goods markets --  and
for incentive  purposes  if ex ante excess  demand  is significant  (and  monetary
overhang  high)  and  supply  elasticities  low.
In summary,  shifts  to RIE regimes  were  attempts  to address  urtde  '.ying
incentive  problems  in  the  CPE  and  thereby  raise  productivity.  The  outcomes  were
inevitably  ambiguous. Wage  regulation  could  contain  wage drift  under  certain
conditions,  including  passive  unions. The  Hungarian  system  appears  successful
on this score  over  most of the  1980s.  By contrast,  where  bargaining  reflects
a  basic argument ovez the wage  level and political power  --  as in Poland --
incomes policies tend to  be  ineffectual in managing lemand as  also on
motivational  grounds.
"  It is instructive  to note that for  Hungary  between  1984  and 1988  wages
averaged  38% of total  cash receipts;  social  benefits  in cash,  22% and other
receipts  including  Drivate  economic  activity,  24%.  See;  C.S.0  Monthly  Bulletin
of Statistics.
1'  Particularly  problematic  in a RlE where  bargaining  over exemptions  and
special  treatment  remains  endemic. See  Gomulka  and  Rostowski  (1984).- 10  -
2.4  The  Reform  Economy  - Second  Stage (R2E)
Little  experience  is  now available,  given  the  recent  nature  of  the  changes
in Poland  and former  GDR.  Broadly,  the objective  of the regime  shift is to
induce lore  completely  market-based  features  in these  economies  through  trade
liberalization,  convertibility  and the direct importation  of international
prices. Fiscal  discipline,  autonomy  of the  monetary  agency  and  elimination  of
the conditions  supporting  a  soft  budget constraint  for enterprises  are other
components.  Unemployment,  wage  dispersion  and  enterprise  failures  are  tolerated.
In princivle,  the R"E regime  is supposed  to  behave  'ike  a capitalist  one; the
main  obstacle  being  ownership  righcs  and  budgetary  transfers.  In  principle,  the
latter  can  be addressed  by pre-announcing  a fiscal  correction  and  pursuing  a
restrictive  monetary  policy  19.  The ownership  issue  is less  tractable. Not
only is  there high concentration  but  also a  large weight of socialized
enterprises  in  total industrial  activity.  In Poland roughly 8000 state
enterprises  account  for  about  90%  of  industrial  output. Rapid  divestiture  raises
major  questions  regarding  valuation,  distributional  and  wealth  effects. To the
extent that divestiture  cannot  be rapid, the question  remains  whether  hard
enterprise  budget  constraints  can  be consistently  enforced.
From the angle  of wage regulation,  this  weight  of the socialist  sector
requires  retention  of certain  wage controls,  particularly  in the  context  of a
stabilization. As usual, the design of the TIP is critical.  For example,
maintaining  controls on the wage bill --  as occurred in  Poland in 1990 --  would
only  tend  to  aggravate  unemployment  in  this  new  context.  Wage  controls  are  also
likely  to have undesired  effects  for an emerging  private  sector.  For this
reason,  private  sector  wages  have been fully  liberalized  in Poland. The  main
tension  remains  permitting  wages to allocate  labour  and serve as a standard
incentive  mechanism  while  maintaining  macroeconomic  balance  in an environment
where  the  rules  are  not fully  perceived  as  having  changed. To the  extent  that
profit  maximization  and the  associated  penalties  genuinely  obtain,  bargaining
models  developed  in t1e  context  of market  economies  are  likely  to  be relevant.
fSction 3  Wagg  Determination  In the  Centrally  planned  Ecom
3.1  Introduction
We now  set  up  wage  games  appropriate  for  a  CPE,  incorporating  an  incentive
payment  applied  through  a  piece-rate,  and  establish  the  outcomes  of  these  games
in  both cooperative  and  non-cooperative  settings  20.  We are  able to show  that
the workers'  reaction  to an incentive  payment can either  result in reduced
productivity/effort  or  a  higher  than  desired  wage  level  and  excess  demand  in  good
markets.
19  Because  of the  ex ante structure  of borrowing  and inter-firm  credits,
such  an  approach  may  be costly  and  a  poor  discriminator  of  underlying  viability,
see  Calvo  and  Coricelli  (1990).
20  Throughout  the  paper  wages  refer  to total  remuneration  including  piece
rate,  bonus  and  other  fringe  payments.e  11  -
3.2  Framework  and Some  Assumptions
We assume  that  there  are  two  important  players  in  the  CPE:  the  Planner  and
the  firms.a The latter  are  comprised  of identical  Workers;  there  is  no distinct
management.  There is a representative  Worker's  utility function.  With no
unemployment  in the  CPE, this function  includes  effort  and the  expected  real
wage. An increased  expected  real  wage  (W/P) increases  consumption  possibilities
either  now  or in  the  future  and  utility  is  hence  a  positive  function  of the  real
wage.  The relevant  price  index  is  the  consumer  price  index  1.  We assume  that
the  Workers  form  their  expectation  of this  period's  price  level  in terms  of  the
previous  period  so that  PI  can  be considered  an exogenous  variable.
Utility is a  negative function  of the effort (Z) delivered.3  The
underlying  argument  is  that  the  Workers  face  a trade  off  between  work  and  leisure
and  prefer  less  hard  work.  For  convenience  we choose  an additive  fo.mulation  of
the  utility  function.
Uw  - u(Z)  +  v(W/PF)
We assume  that  u'(Z)  <  0, u"(Z)  <  0, v'(W)  >  0, and  v"(W)  <  0. That  u"(Z)  <  0
follows  from  the  fact  that  the  disutility  associated  with  a  high  effort  increases
with  more  effort. The  indifference  curves  will  be  upward  sloping  in  the 'effort
- wages  space.
The  Planner's  role  is to set  economic  targets  and  achieve  them.  In  doing
so, the  Planer  might  be concerned  about  a number  of objectives,  including  the
volume of  investment,  private consumption,  growth, income equality,  price
stability,  and the degree  of excess  demand  on the goods  markets.  This  can  be
treated in the  following  way.  The Planner has  multiple  objectives,  the
rec  ncilation  of  which  consistently  imposes  a  tension  on the  system. To  achieve
the  objectives,  the  Planner  allocates  the  whole  labor  force,  n, to production.
The output  price  level  from the last  period,  P, is maintained. Finally,  the
Planner  sets  a  certain  minimum  wage  calculated  per  time  unit.  We call  this  basis
wage,  Wis.
2  In section  3-5  a closed  economy  is assumed.
2  It can  be argued  that in  an  economy  with  chronic  excess  demand  for  goods
the real wage is not a good measure  for the consumption  possibilities  of a
certain  nominal  wage.  However  we have  chosen  not  to include  any  measure  of the
rationing  at  the  goods  market.  The  reason  is that  there  is  no  a  priori  knowledge
of the  way excess  demand  on the goods  market  influences  the  workers'  desired
wage. One argument  is that a rationed  goods market will lead to less wage
pressure,  cf.  Ellis  and  Fender  (1985),  while  another  view is that  the  workers
will  compensate  for  the  present  goods  rationing  by demanding  .aigher  wages (for
later  effective  consumption  or for  purchase  of goods at the  black markets).
Charemza  and  Gronicki  (1983)  call  this  last  argument  "wage  illusion".
2  A formulation  of the  worker's  utility  function  close  to the  one chosen
here can  be found  in  Sokolovskii  (1987),  p5.- 12  -
The Planner also seeks  high production,  hence growth.  To yield these
targets  a  plan  which  sets  the  guniLty of the  governments'  investments  and  other
expenditures  (I)  along  with the  private  consumption  (C)  is  developed. Since  the
economy  is  closed  we  have  that  the  Planner  will  have  a  planned  production  target
(Ypw)  equal  to:
Yp,,, - I  +  C  (3.1]
The  Planner  gives  priority  to fulfilment  of  Ypw and  deviations  from the  target
leaves  the  Planner  with the  utility  -00.
This  model  is  a fixed  price  model  and  hence  we can  have that  the  Workers'
notional  demand  for  goods  can  exceed  the  effective  supply.  If  this  is the  case,
then  we assume  that the  private  consumption  is rationed, 2'  We assume  that  the
Workers  have  no  voluntary  savings. This  means  that  the  Workers'  notional  demand
is equal  to their  income  Wn.  Excess  demand  can  hence  be written  as:
X - Wn - PI - PY,  (3.2]
where  Y is  the  real  production. We assume  that  the  Planner  prefers  zero  excess
demand  and every deviation  from this target  decreases  the Planner's  utility.
We also assume  that the economy  is initially  in a situation  of excess  demand
which  implies  that  once  Y>- is  attained  the  Planner's  utility  increases  as the
wage decreases.
The  CPE  has  one  firm  managed  by  the  Planner.  The  firm's  production  function
can  be written  as:
Y  Zf(n)
The  production  is  a  function  of the  labour  input  and  its  technical  productivity,
f(n),  multiplied  with the  measure  for  the  effort/productivity  delivered  by the
Workers,  Z.  It is assumed  that  f(n)  >  0,  f'(n)  > 0, f"(n)  < 0.
We have chosen  a particular  utility  function  for the  Planner.  Once the
production  target is reached,  utility  decreases  quadratically  as the excess
demand  deviates  from  its  "optimal"  value,  zero.  If  we use the  above  formulation
of the  utility  function  we can  write  the  Planner's  utility  function  as:
X00  if  Y + Y
Up-  [3.3]
L  -Bj[PZf(n)-Wn-PI]a  if  Y  - y33
We have assumed that n is exogenous,  so the Planner  will need an average
productivity  equal to Zpt - Yp-/f(n)  to fulfill  the  plan. Therefore,  if the
productivity  is Zp  and the wage is W - (P/n)(Zpvf(n)-I)  the  Planner  attains
maximum  utility  (equal  to zero).
I  In similar vein to Ellis and Fender (1985)  and other fixed price
literature.- 13  -
Due  to  the  very  centralized  management  of the  firm  the  Planner  has  limited
possibilities  for  monitoring  the  work  more and  hence  cannot  rely  on flexible  or
nuanced  payment  schemes. Hence,  to motivate  Workers  the  Planner  has  recourse
to piece-rate  payments  ".  We have chosen  the following  formulation  for the
piece-rate  payment:
W - W,,  +  CZ  (3.4]
Wb.  is the core wage determined  by  the Planner according to social and
distributional  preferences,  a  denotes  the  piece-rate  payment  with  Wale  2  0, a
0.
3.3  Cooperative  Wage Bargaining:  A Dictatorial  Solution
In this  section  we look at the  wage determination&as  a  cooperative  game
with  the  wage  (and  the  effort)  being  the  result  of  bargaining  between  the  Planner
and  the  Workers.  For the  time  being,  we assume  that  the  Planner  and the  Workers
do not  take  into  account  systems  for  monitoring  that  the  result  of the  bargain
is  actually  adhered  to.
The Planner  and the  Workers  have the  utility  functions  Up  and  Uw. Let  Up
denote  the  Planner's  threat  point  and  Uw the  Workers'  threat  point."  Let  0 (O
< e  s  1)  be the  Planner's  bargaining  power. Hence  1-0  is  the  Workers'  bargaining
power.
The  Nash-Zeuthen-Harsanyi  (NZH)  solution  to  the  cooperative  game  with  two  players
is found  like  this:"
Max (  [Up  - Up  IeUw - Uw]4  }
W.Z
We assume  for  the  Workers'  threat  point;  Uw  - u(O)+v(W,w/P6),  a situation  where
the  Workers  choose  not  to  deliver  any  effort  at  all  and  hence  just  receive  Wb.
We assume  that the  Planner  has an arbitrarily  given  threat  point  Up (<  Up).  We
get:
Max ( [Up  - Up]e[Uw  - (u(O)+v(WU./P))141  )  (3.5]
w,z
Equation  (3.5]  denotes  the NZH solution  to the  bargaining  between  the Planner
and  the  Workers  as  a function  of the  bargaining  power  0.  The set  of bargaining
I  Extra-ordinary  payments  for  above-norm  effort  have also been commonly
employed;  see  Adam (1979).
6  The threat  point denotes  the lowest  utility  the  player  will accept  as
result  of the  bargaining.
2  See Friedman  (1986)  chp. 5 for  a standard  treatment  of the  cooperative
game. Svejnar  (1986)  contains  a very good presentation  of the Nash-Zeuthen-
Harsanyi  solution  for  an asymmetric  bargaining  game.14
solutions  (as  Q varies  between  0 and  1)  is  the  efficiency  locus.
Let  us  discuss  the  shape  of  the  efficiency  locus. If  the  bargaining  result
implies  that  the  Workers'  productivity  is  different  from  Zp,,,  the PlaWer's
utility  Up  will  be -0.  The Planner  will then  stick  to the  threat  point  Up  and
hence  the  product  in  [3.4]  will  be  zero.  To  avoid  this,  the  average  productivity
must  be  Zp,. The  Workers'  utility  can  never  get  below  u(Z)+v(Wb/P)  since  the
Workers'  gain  from  the  bargain  in  that  case  would  be  negative.  From  this  we  have
that  the  efficiency  locus  will  be the  points  on  the  Z,.  line  lying  above  the
point  where  the  Workers'  indifference  curve  u(O)+v(W,./PE)  intersects  the  Z7.,
line.  If  0 is  big (the  Planner  has large  bargaining  power)  we will get  a
solution  near  the  intersection.  As  e becomes  smaller  the  Whole  line  of  solutions
will  be  traced.  The  efficiency  locus  (the  NZH  solutions)  is  drawn  in  figure  3.1
as  a  bold  line. ThM  point,  D, is  where  the  indifference  curve  u(O)+v(WM,/PO)
intersects  the  Zpm  line.
Figure  3.1
W' \  /  u(o)+v(Wb./r)
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We now  look  at  a  special  bargaining  solution,  namely  the  one  where  the
Workers'  indifference  curve  u(O)+v(W"/P)  intersects  the  Zp,  line.  This  is  the
NZH solution  to  the  problem  in  equation  (3.5]  in  the  limit  case  where  e  -.  1.
We  will  call  this  particular  solution  the  'Dictatorial  solution'  since  it  is  the
outcome  of a bargaining  where  the  Workers  have  no  bargaining  power  and  the
Planner  dictates  the  result  of  the  bargaining.  It  can  be  written  as  the  vector
(WO,Z  ),  such  that:
ze  - t  [3.6]
U(Z )+V(W/r)  - U(O)+V(Wb/P 0 )  [3.71
8  - . 1,  but  e  +  1 (since  if  8  was  equal  to 1  then  the  Workers  would stick
to  their  threat  point).- 15  -
The  Planner  will  choose  to  produce  the  planned  output  and  pay  a  wage  Just  exactly
suffiLient  to keep the  Workers from delivering  zero effort. The Dictatorial
solutlon  can  hence  be interpreted  as  a  solution  where  the  Planner  maxLmizes  the
utility  Up  glven  that  the  WorkersI  utility  is squeezed  as much  as possible.
We  now  return  to  the  monitoring  problem. How  can  the  Planner  be sure thet
the Workers will actually deliver the agreed upon effort, Zw,,,  for  the
DictatorLal  solution?  The only thing the Planner  can monitor  is the actual
production.  To avoid  the  Workers  receiving  the  payment  W'  but delivering,  for
example,  no effort,  the Planner  pays the  Workers  according  to the  pLece-rate
system  described  above. The Planner  chooses  a piece-rate  a  such  that the sum
of the  base  wage  and the  piece-rate  payment  equals  the  agreed  wage  W;
Wb.+*Zp4,,,  - W1  (3.81
This implementatione  of the  Dictatorial  solution  is illustrated  in  flgure  3.2.
The Planner  will choose  a piece-rate  0a such that the 1ine  W - Wb+OZ  passes
through  the  point  D.
FLgure  3.2  u(O)+v(W>./P)
z-J,
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The  Dictatorial  solution  implemented  via  a  piece-rate  system  (given  by the
equations  [3.5],  [3.6],  and [3.7])  is,  however,  unstable. In this  set-up the
Workers  de-ive  nothing  from  the  bargain  yet  have the  possibility  of  reneging  on
the outcome  3.  Once the  Workers realize  that (a  ,Zp1.)  from  equations [3.6]-
(3.8]  is the  outcome  of  the  bargain  they  can  react  by  playing  the  game  in  a  non-
cooperative  manner. This  means that,  given  the  piece-rate  a  the  Workers  will
S  The piece-rate is  a'  - (W'-Wtw)/Z&,.
X  Note that  wb> is  exogenous  and  predetermined. If this  was  not the  case
the Planner could always  adjust the  base wage so as to  make whatever combinatlon
of  wage and  productivity  level  a stable  solution.*  16 -
decrease  their  productivity  (and  their total  wage) to increase  their  utility.
This  behavior  is illustrated  in figure  3.3.
Flgure  3.3
Wb.+(4dZ
The  point,  D,  again  denotes  the  Dictatorial  solution. The  point  D'  will  be the
Workers'  optimal  combination  of  wage  and  effort  given  that  the  Planner  has  chosen
the  piece-rate  a.
From the  above  discussion,  it can be seen  that  the  Dictatorial  solution
tends  to  be unstable,  since  the  Planner  has  not  taken  into  account  the  Workers'
reaction  on disclosure  of the  piece-rate  a.  This  relates  to  the  uneven  nature
of  the  bargaining  '.  To the  extent  that  the  solution  sticks,  planned  production
will always  be attained,  the wage will be relatively  low and the likelihood
and/or  the  amount  of excess  demand  will hence  be relatively  small.
We now  examine  the  Dictatorial  solution  more closely. We know that the
productivity  Z will  be Zpw  and  that  the  wage can  be found  from  equation  [3.7].
By inserting  Z - Zpt  in equation  [3.7]  we find  W*  from:  .
u(Zpn)+v(W'/P)  - u(O)+v(W./P')  [3.9]
From  this  we  write  the  Workers'  wage  as a  function  of the  base  wage,  the  planned
productivity,  the  price  expectations,  and  (formally)  the  Planner's  threat  point:
C,)  (W)  C?  J
W-  fn(Wb., ZPW, F, Up)  (3.10]
The sign  pattern  i,s  derived  in  Appendix  1  and '.ndicated  by the  signs  above  the
31  Note, however,  that certain features  of the CPE, make achieving  a
dictatorial  solution  not wholly  improbable. These  features  have included;  an
absence  of trade  unions  and  a  powerful  repressive  apparatus.- 17 -
variables  in  equation  (3.10].  An increased  base  wage  will  lead  to  a  higher  total
wage since it is  now more attractive  for the  Workers  to stick  to their  threat
point,  i.e.  not to  work. When the  planned  productivity  is increased,  the  total
wage  rises;  this  follows  from  the  curvature  of  the  Workers'  indifference  curves.
Finally,  an increase in the  Workers' price expectations do not necessarily lead
to higher  wages.  A higher  expected  price  means lower  real  wages  which  is not
desired.  However,  the real value of the threat  point's  W"  also falls.  The
resulting  effect  is  uncertain. The Planner's  threat  point  does  not affect  the
optimal  wage.
3.4  The Stackelberg  Solution  in  a Non-Cooperative  Game
We continue  by examining  what  the  Planner  can  do  to  prevent  the  instability
shown  above. The  wage  determination  game  is  non-cooperative  and  we  examine  what
happens  if the  Workers'  reaction  is  taken  into  account  by the  Planner. We work
with the same  Planner  and the  same Workers  as described  in section  3.1.  The
Planner  is assumed  to  be a Stackelberg  leader.
We  assume the  following "sequencing"  of  the non-cooperative  game.
Basically  the  Workers  produce  the  output  and  hence  determine  the  effort  while
the  Planner  pays  wage to the  Workers. The  Workers  decide  on their  productivity
given  the  offered  wage.  We assume  they  take  into  account  that  the  Planner  uses
a  piece-rate  remuneration  system.
Workers'  Reaction  Curve
For  every  value  of the  piece-rate  a  which  the  Planner  chooses,  the  Workers  will
choose  an  effort  maximizing  their  utility. The  set  of  effort-wage  combinations
derived  in this  way is the  Workers'  reaction  curve. We find it  by maximizing
the Workers'  utility function  subject to a given piece-rate.  The Workers'
problem  is:
lax  (  u(Z)  +  v((Wb.4GZ)/P)  1
The first order condition  leads to the reaction  curve given implicitly  by
equation  [3.11]:
u'(Z)  +  v'((W.4+aZ)/r)(U/P)  - 0  [3.113
Figure  3.4 gives  a graphical  illustration  for  the  construction  of the  Workers
reaction  curve.  As regards  the shape  of the  Workers'  reaction  curve,  it  will
always  originate  in the  point  (Z,  W) - (0,  Wb.).  The reaction  curve  will tend
to move upwards  being led  by the increasing  piece-rate. However,  segments  of- 18 -
Figure  3.4
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the  curve  can  easily  be  backward  bending,  this  being  a  consequence  of  the  income
effect  dominating  the  substitution  effect.
Ti  Planner  as Stackelberg  Leader
The Planner playing the non-cooperative  game as a Stackelberg  leader
regards  the  Workers'  reaction  curve  as the  possible  combinations  of effort  and
wage. The  Planner's  problem  is  hence  to  maximize  profit  given  the  possibilities
depicted  by the Workers'  react'on  curve  and given that the Planner  only can
change  the  piece-rate  parametEr  a.  The  Planner's  problem  can  be written  as:
Max  Up  s.t.  u'(Z)  +  v'((Wb..4wZ)/PI)(a/PI)  - 0  [3.121
As a Stackelberg  leader  the  Planner  maximizes  Up  by paying  a total  salary  given
by the  lowest  point  where  the  Workers'  reaction  curve  crosses  the  Z*-  line. That
is,  the  Planner  chooses  the  piece-rate  a  where the  line  Wb.+a  Z passes  through
the lowest  intersection  point  between  the  Workers'  reaction  curve  and the  Zpw,
line.  This  point is  called  S in figure  3.5  and is  the  Stackelberg  solution.
From  figure  3.5  we can  derive  two  important  results:
1)  The  Stackelberg  solution  is  stable  in the  sense  that  none  of the  players  have
any  incentive  to deviate  from the  solution. The  Workers  cannot  get  higher
m See  Appendix  2 for a  detailled  discussion  of the  shape  of the  reaction
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utility  given the piece-rate  oa.  (Their  indifference  curve  just tangents  the
point  S).  The Planner  can  not get  higher  utllity  by lowerlng  the  piece-rate,
because  then  the  production  will fall  short  of the  production  target.
2) The  wage  will normally  be higher  for  this  solution  than for  the  Dictatoital
solution  found  above. This  makes  sense  given  that  in the  case  with the
Dictatorial  solution  the  Planner  squeezed  the  Workers  as  much  as possLble,  l.e.
to  their  threat  point,  while  in  the  case  of  the  Stackelberg  solution  the  Planner
took  the  Workers'  reaction  into  account.
However,  as  a  consequence  of  the  relative  high  wage  payment  implied  by the
Stackelberg  solution  it is very likely  that there  will be significant  excess
demand  on the  goods  market. This is a  frequently  observed  phenomenon  in CPEs,
which  (at  least  partially)  can  be  explained  by a  high  wage  pressure  stemming  from
the non-cooperative  functloning  of the labour  market  3.  In conclusion,  the
Stackelberg  solution  proved  stable  but  had  the  drawback  that  the  wage  would  tend
to be relatively  high with a large excess  demand  on the goods  market  as the
result.
Because  the  Workers'  reaction  curve  can  contain  backward  bending  segments
the  multipliers  cannot  be  calculated  just  by  using  the  Implicit  Function  Theorem.
However,  by adding  one extra  assumptlon  (namely  that  v3(W) >  0) we can still
sign the  multipliers.
The  solution  to  the  Planner's  problem  (expression  [3.12])  is  to  choose  the
procuctivity  Z - Z  and  then the  lowest  piece-rate  a satisfying  the  equation
for  the  Worker's  reaction  curve. That  is,  the  Planner  chooses  a  as the  lowest
g  satisfying
1'  A special  case can occur  when the  reaction  curve  is backward  bendlng.
If the  reaction  curve  bends  backwards  before  it  reaches  the  productivity  target
(the  ZO,  line)  the  Planner  will  never  be able  to  obtain  the  planned  production.- 20 -
u'(ZP,)  +  V'((Wb.,+oZp1.,)/P)(a/P9)  - 0
If  we assume  existence  of a  Stackelberg  Equilibrium,  the  Planner  will  choose  the
wage (and  hence  the  piece-rate)  occuring  at the  lowest  point  where  the  Workers'
reaction  curve  intersects  the  Zw-  line. By  using  this  reasoning  the  multipliers
for  the  Dictatorial  solution  can  be calculated  (See  Appendix  2).
(+)  (+)  C
W  - fnW  M.,  ZPh,  P)
It  should  be  noted  that  the  wage initially  will  be  higher  in  this  situation  than
in  the  earlier  case.  Furthermore,  while  the  multipliers  have the  same signs  as
for  the  cooperative  game they  will generally  n= have the same  size.
3.5  Summary
In our treatment  of the CPE we find that  the combination  of centrally
determined  production  targets  and  piece-rate  remuneration  lead to either,  (a)
unstable  solutions  with a tendency  for  under-attainment  of production  targets,
or (b),  stable  solutions  with  a  likely  high  level  of  wages  and  significant  excess
demand  in the  goods  market.
Section  4: Wage  Determination In the RefEL  I  Zggp=
4.1  Introduction
The  main  features  of the  RlE  have  been  discussed  in  Section  2. The  regime
might  be  considered  a  partial  response  to  the  incentive  problems  associated  with
the  CPE  involving  greater  decentralization.  In  particular,  the  RlE  has implied
greater  autonomy  for  the  workers  and  the  managers  in  the  setting  of  production,
investment  and  remuneration  at  their  firms with explicit association  of
remuneration  to  a  performance  indicator.  One  underlying  argument  for  the  reforms
that  installed  an  RlE  regime  was  that  by  imposing  the  'right'  incentive  structure
on the  managers  the latter  would  balance  the  workers'  demand  for  higher  wages
and/or  ensure  that  the  workers  deliver  a  high  effort. To  phrase  it  slightly  more
technically,  the reforms aimed to engage the workers  and the managers in a
cooperative  game  determining  production  and  remuneration.  The government  could
then  choose  the  outcome  of this  game  by imposing  the  'right'  i-centive  structure
on the  workers  and  the  managers.
Our hypothesis is that the actual outcomes  of the reforms deviated
significantly  from  intended  outcomes.  Especially  in  Poland,  the  government  became
engaged  in a game witV the  workers and  managers  concerning  the  allocation  of
resources  in the  economy.  This game can  be stylized  as one  where  the  workers
and  managers  played (more  or less)  together  against  the  government  or planner.- 21 -
This  section  will  model two  games.  Section  4.2  deals  with  a  cooperative
game  between  the  managers  and t'te  workers  with  an  exogenous  incentive  structure
imposed  by the planner.  This game is in reality  a two perso..  game with the
planner  as  nature. Section  4.3 sets  up a  three  player  game  which  is  cooperative
between  the  managers  and the  workers  and  non-cooperative  between  these  too  and
the  government  or planner.
4.2  A cooperative  game
There are two players, the Manager and the Workers. The  Planner's
preferences  do  not  appear  directly  but  the  Planner's  policy  and  the  institutional
arrangement  influence  the  outcome  of  the  co3perative  game. Hence,  the  Planner's
behaviour  represents  nature and is exogenous  to the  Manager  and the Workers.
We impose  the same  assumptions  on the  Workers  in the  RlE as  for the CPE.  To
simplify  the  calculations  we have chosen  to set  the  price  expectation  variable
r  - 1.  The  Workers'  utility  function  now reads;
Uw  - u(Z)  +  v(W)
We  use  the  same  production  function  as in  section  3  and  assume  employment  at the
firm to be exogenously  given by the Planner  as n.  The Manager's  utility is
assumed  to be a function  of the remuneration  received. The Manager's total
remuneration  (R) is a fraction (a2)  of the firm's  profit (PZf(n)-Wn)  and a
fraction  (a3)  of che  value  of the  firm's  production  (PZf(n)).
R  - a2(PZf(n)-Wn)  +  x,PZf(n)
We assume  0 c  ok  <  1 ,  0 <  a3 e  1.  This  arrangement  for  R broadly  reflects  the
incentive  structure  established  in the  RlE '.  We simplify  and  obtain:
R  - a,PZf(n)  - a2Wn, where  a,  - a+a 3.
The Manager's  remuneration  is expressed  as a positive  linear  function  of the
production  value  and  a  negative  linear  function  of  the  total  wage-bill,  Wn,  with
a linear  band  between  them. We assume  that  the  Planner  can  impose  some  penalty
on the  Manager's  remuneration  if the  Manager  pays  wages  to the  Workers above  a
certain  target. To ease the computations  we choose  a very simple  formulation
of this  tax. We assume  that the  Planner  can  change  ao independently  of ac.  In
other words,  the Planner  can increase  the deductions  based  on the wage-bill
without  increasing  the  Manager's  payment  based  on the  value  of the  production.
Henceforth,  we will  interpret  the 'incentive  coefficients'  in  the  following  way
(a 1 >0 ,  a >  0):  a,  <  a2 implies  a  profit  tax  and  an extra  tax  on the  wage-bill;
3  As explained  in section  2 the  reforms  also  allowed  the  strengthening  of
the  private  sector  and  often  gave  rise  to  dual  pricing  systems.  These  topics  will
not be considered  in this paper. See Commander  and Coricelli (1990) for a
theoretical  discussion  of a dual pricing  system  in  a RlE.
X  The  workers  normally  face economic  incentives  similar  to the  managers,
but the  bonus  payment  constitutes  a much smaller  part  of the  workers'  overall
salary  than  it does  of the  mnrnagers'  salary.22 -
,  OI  implies  that  only profit in taxed  and  a,  >  aa implies  that  profit and
production  value  are taxed.
For  convenience,  the  expectation  to the  price  level  is taken  as  constant
and  hence  does  not  enter  explicitly  in  the  Manager's  utility  function. Finally,
we  assume  that  the  Manager's  utility  is  directly  proportional  to  the  remuneration
received. The  Manager  is  risk  neutral. We can  now  write  the  Manager's  utility
function,  Ut,  as:
UM  - a,PZf(n)  - %aWn.
For  simplicity,  0  S  a,  ￿  1  and  0  S  02  S  1. The  Me.aager'c  indifference  curves  are
straight  lines  with the  slope (a,/%)(Pf(n)/n).
The  Planner's  utility  function  is  somewhat  modified  in  relation  to the  CPE
case.  We assume  that the  Planner  does  not exclusively  emphasize  a production
target  and  instead  concentrates  equally  on excess  demand  and  the  deviation  from
the production  target.  The Planner prefers zero excess  demand and every
deviation  from  this  target  decreases  the  Planner's  utility.  However,  the  formula
for  excess  demand  (X)  is  now somewhat  different,  since  the  remuneration  of the
Manager  has to  be taken into account.  Below,  the expression  in the curled
bracket  is the  Manager's  remuneration.
X  - Wn  +  (cgPZf(n)-a2Wn)  +  PI  - PY
X  - PI - (l-a 1)PZE(n)  +  (l-a2)Wn
We use an additive  quadratic  utility function  where the utility decreases
quadratically  as excess  demand  or production  deviates  from 'optimal'  values.
The Planner's  utility  function  is  given  by:
Up  -1B[PI-(l-at)PZf(n)+(l-a 2)Wn]2 - B2[y_y*-.2
The Planner  needs an average  effort/productivity  equal  to Z,  - Y^m/f(n) to
fulfil  the plan.  Therefore,  if the productivity  is Zp  and the wage is W -
(P/n)(Zp,f(n)-I)  the  Planner  attains  the  maximum  utility  (equal  to zero).  This
point is called  Op.  The Planner's  indifference  curves  are elliptical  curves
around  this  optimal  value  and  examples  are given  in figure  4.1.
The  Planner  still  sets  the  employment  n and  the  price  level  P.  There  is
no piece-rate  system  in this economy  and hence  no Wbm to set.  Instead the
Planner  sets the  incentive  parameters  a,  and  a2.23
Figure  4.1
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The  wage and  effort  are determined  by bar&aining  between  the  Workers  and
the  Manager. We  call  the  Manager's  threat  point  Um  and  the  Workers'  threat  point
uw.  e  (O s  e9 1)  denotes  the  Manager's  bargaining  power  and  1-8  is  the  Workers'
bargaining  power.  The  NZH solution  to the  bargaining  between  the Manager  and
the  Workers  is:
Max  (  [UM  - UM]  [Uw - UW1  )  [4*.1]
w,z
If we insert  UM  - CtPZf(n)-%Wn  and  Uw  u(Z)+v(W)  in  expression  [4.1],  we have:
Max (  [a,PZf(n)-OaWn  - UM]¶[u(Z)+v(W)  - U.w]  1  [4.2]
w,z
Expression  [4.2]  denotes  the  NZH  solution  to the  bargaining  between  the  Manager
and the  Workers  as a function  of the  bargaining  power  0.
From the  first  order  conditions  for  the  problem  in [4.2]  we get  the  efficiency
locus." It can  be written  as:
a, Pf(n)  u'(Z)
____  . D  - [4.3]
a2 n  v'(W)
The interpretation  of expression (4.3]  is that of a traditional  efficiency
condition,  namely  that the marginal  rate of substitution  (between  effort  and
wage)  for  the  Manager  shall  equal  (minus)  the  marginal  rate  of substitution  for
the Workers.  The efficiency  locus represents  the set of the Nash-Zeuthen-
"  See  appendix  3 for  the formal  derivation  of the  efficiency  locus.- 24 -
HarsanyL  solutions  as e  varies  between  0 and 1.  The slope  of the efficiency
locus  proves  to  be  negative  (Appendix  3). The  intultion  is  that  if  the  Manager
has  a  lot  of  bargainlng  power  the  solution  will  be  close  to  the  Manager's  optimal
choice,  vlz,  high effort  and low  wage (and  hence the  solutions  will  be in  the
lower,  right  hand  part  of the efficlency  locus).  If the  Workers  have large
bargaining  power  we  will  have  solutions  with  low  effort  and  a  high  wage. The
indifference  curves  for  the  Manager  and  the  Workers  and  the  efficiency  locus,
L,  are  drawn  in  Figure  4.2.
Figure  4.2
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The  actual  outcome  of  the  bargaining  depends  on  the  bargaining  power  0  of
the  two  players.  Later  we  will  assume  that  the  Managers  and  the  Workers  have
the  same  bargaining  power.  In  this  section  we  will  briefly  c.nsider  what  happens
to  the  efficiency  locus  as  the  Planner  changes  some  of  the  exogenous  variables.
We will  examine  what  happens  to the  efficiency  locus  if  the  Planner  changes  the
incentive  structure  given  to  the  Managers.  Assume  that  the  Manager's  penalty
on  the  wage-bill,  Wn,  is  zaised;  i.e.  q 2 is  increased.  The  Workers'  indifference
curves  are  untouched,  while  the  Manager's  indifference  lines  will  be flatter.
This  means  that  the  efficiency  locus  will  move  downwards  and  to the  left.  In
Figure  4.3  the  original  efficiency  locus  is  called  L  and  the  one  resulting  from
an  increase  in  c4  is  called  L'. That  the  efficiency  locus.will  move  downward  can
be  verified  directly  from  the  expression  for  the  efficiency  locus,  eq.  (4.3].
dW/da2  (given  Z)  is  found  in  Appendix  3.3 The  sign  is,  as  also  argued  above,
negative.





We now  derive  the  multipliers  for  the  change  of the  wage  as  a function  of
changes  in  the  exogenous  variables.  We assume  that  the  two  players  have the  same
bargaining  power,  e  - 1.  If we insert  this  in [4.2]  and  square  the expression
in the curled  bracket,  the solution  to the  bargaining  problem  can be written
as30
Max ( [a,PZf(n)-%Wn  - Um][u(Z)+v(W)  - Uw] )  [4.4]
w,z
This  is the  symmetric  Nash  bargaining  solution. Appendix  3  shows  how the  first
order  conditions  yield two  equations  having  to be satisfied  at the same time.
By using  the  Implicit  Function  Theorem  on the  first  order  conditions  we obtain
a  set  of two  equations  for  each  exogenous  variable.  This  set  can  be solved  using
Cramer's  rule providing  the multipliers  showing  how each endogenous  variable
influences  W and  Z. We  write  the  Nash  bargaining  wage (W)  as a  function  of all
the  exogenous  variables. Eq. (4.5]  provides  the  basis  for  the  estimations  in
Section  6 of the  paper.
Ws - fn(c 1,  a2,  P, n,  UM, Uw)  (4.5]
An increase  in the  incentive  parameter  for  production  (a 1) increases  the  wage.
The  reason  for  this  is that  to  make the  Workers  produce  more  the  Manager  has  to
pay  higher  wages.  An increase  in the  wage-bill  tax  (a2)  decreases  the  wage.  If
the  price  increases,  the  Manager's  remuneration  increases,  this  leading  to  higher
wages in this  cooperative  game.  The sign  for  employment  (n)  is  undetermined.
X  To  square the expression does not  change the solutions to  this
maximization  problem,  since  X
2 is a  monotone  transformation  when  x 2 0.- 26  -
If  the  Manager's  threat  point,  UM,  increases  the  wage  will  falls,  while  an
increase  in  the  Worker's  threat  point,  Uw, will lead  to  an increased  wage.
We  continue  this  section  with some  remarks  about  the  Planner.  As  mentioned
above  thero is a combination  of productivity  and wage yielding the Planner
maximum  utility.  This  can  be attaineA  by setting  up an appropriate  incentive
structure  for the  Manager,  i.e.  by regulating  a,,  o,. Appendix  3 contains  the
calculations  for dZ/da,  and dZ/da2.  One of the multipliers  has undetermined
sign, but  generally the  multipliers dZ/da, and  dZ/da2  will  be  linearly
independent  of dW/da,  and dW/da,.  This means that we have two  goals and two
linearly  independent  instruments  and hence the Planner  can always  obtain the
desired  productivity  and wage just by adjusting  a, and a2.  Graphically  the
changes  in  a,  and  Ga correspond  to  changes  in  the  slope  and  the  intercept  (on  the
W-axis) of the Manaser's isoprofit lines.  By changing  the slope and the
intercept  of the  isoprofit  lines  the Planner  can ensure  that  the  Workers'  and
the Manager's Nash bargaining solution is just at the  Planner's  utility
maximizing  point,  Op (see Figure 4.4). Point B denotes the Nash bargaining
solution  which  coincides  with  Op.





4.3  A cooperative  game  nested  in a non-cooperative  game
We now  establish  a three  person  game  for  the  wage  determination.  Because
three  person  games  are normally  difficult  to apply since  the possibility  of
coalitions  has  to  be  taken  into  account,  we impose  some  restrictive  assumptions.
The managers  and  the  workers  play a cooperative  game,  while these  two  players
"  Note that if soft budget constraints  hold and/or the Manager's
remuneration  is  ultimately  weakly  linked  to performance,  it  might  be expected
that  the  Manager's  threat  point  would  be very low.- 27 -
play a  non-cooperative  game  against  the  government  or  planner.  We will show  how
nesting  the  cooperative  game  in  a  non-cooperative  setting  changes  the  bargaining
and leads  to some  unexpected  results.
There are three  players in the game, the Manager,  the  Workers and the
Planner. The  Manager's  and the  Workers'  utility  functions  are the same as in
Section  4.2.  When the Manager and the Workers cooperate  we call these two
players,  the  Firm.  We use the  same  quadratic  utility  function  for  the Planner
as the  one  described  in  section  4.2.
The following  sequencing  of the  game is assumed. The Planner  calls  out
a certain  wage  target  and  the  Manager  and  the  Workers  react  to  this  by deciding
on a  certain  effort.  The Planner  reacts  to this announcement  of the Firm's
effort/productivity  by offering  another  wage. However,  this reaction  will be
taken  into  account  by  the  Manager  and  the  Workers.  The  Firms'  reaction  will  again
be  taken  into account by  the  Planner,  and  so  on.  This  leads  to  a  non-
cooperative  Nash  equilibrium.  We assume  that  the  Manager  and  the  Workers  maximize
the product  of their  utility  gain subject  to (the  Planner's  choice  of) W. We
assume  again  that  the  two  players  have  even  bargaining  power,  e  - ½. The  problem
for the  Firm  can  be written  as:
Max ( [a1PZf(n)-oWn - UM][u(Z)+v(W) - U.] 1  (4.6]
z
Note that  the  above  problem  closely  resembles  the  problem  in  expression  (4.4].
However,  in this case  we maximize  only with respect  to Z, assuming  that W is
given.  This  means that our solution  will be a function  relating  the Firm's
optimal  choice  of Z to W.'  The solution  to the  problem  in (4.6]  is found in
Appendix  4, The  reaction  curve  is given (implicitly)  by equation  [4.7].
alPf(n)  a,PZf(n)-%aWn
- _____  - -[(4.7]
u'(Z)  u(Z)+v(W)  -Uw
The interpretation  of (4.7] is straightforward.  The ratio of the Manager's
utility gain to that of the Workers' is equal to (minus)  the ratio of the
marginal  utilities  resulting  from  an increase  in  productivity.
The  reaction  curve  given  by [4.7]  is  npt  the  same  as the  efficiency  locu3
found  as equation  [4.3]. The reason  is that  the  optimization  problem  required
to find  the  reaction  curve  is  more restricted  than  the  one  required  to find  the
efficiency  locus. This  means  on the  other  hand  that  the  reaction  curve  will =
(generally) pass  through  the  tangency  point  between  the Manager's  and  the
Workers'  indifference  curves. In figure  4.5  the  reaction  curve  is  drawn  in  bold
(R)  for  the  same indifference  curves  as  used in figure  4.2.  The slope  of the
Firm's  reaction  curve  is  positive  (Appendix  4).
1  In all the calculations  in section  6 we have assumed  that the threat
points  are exogenous.  This can be justified  by pointing  to the fact that the
"rules  of  the  game"  have  determined  the  formation  of  coalitions  a  priori.  Hence,
the  players  do not  consider  other  coalitions  than  the  one  actually  formed.- 28 -
Figure  4.5
w  Firms'  reaction  curve
The Planner  reacts  to the Firm's  effort/productivity  by choosing  the
utility  maximizing  wage.  To  ootain  the  Planner's  reaction  curve  we  must  maximize
the  utility  function  Up  with  respect  to  W. We  have:
Max  (  -B[PI-(l-a 1)PZf(n)+(l-a2)Wn] 2 - B2(Y_y&,] 2 1  [4.8]
w
The first  order  condition  for  the  maximization  problem  leads  after  a little
simplifycation  to  eq.  [4.9]  which  also  can  be  written  as  in  eq.  (4.10].
PI-(l-a,)PZf(n)+(l-a2)Wn  - 0  [4.9]
(l-eO)Pf(n)  PI
W  - - - Z  - [4.10]
(1-oa)  n  (1-42)
We see  from  eq. [4.9]  that  the  Planner's  reaction  curve  simply  is  a  relation
between  wage  and  productivity  such  that  excess  demand  is  zero. The  reason  for
this  is  that  given  the  Firm's  choice  of  effort/productlvity,  the  only  thing  the
Planner  can  do ls  to  try  to  get  as low  excess  demand  as  possible,  viz;  zero
excess  demand.  Further,  the  Planner's  reaction  curve  can  be  expressed  explicitly
and  is  linear  (eq.  [4.10]);  a  consequence  of  our  choice  of  utility  function  for
the  Planner.  Finally,  the  slope  of  the  reaction  curve  is  positive.
The  number  of  players  is  reduced  to  two,  the  Firm  and  the  Planner.  We  find
the  Nash  equilibrium  (N)  as  the  intersection  of  the  two  players'  reaction  curves.
This  is  illustrated  in  figure  4.6.  The  Flrm's  reaction  curve  is  steeper  than  that
of  the  Planner.  Thls  is a necessary  condition  for  the  stability  of the  Nash
equilibrium.29 -
Figure  4.6
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In figure  4.7  are  the  same  reaction  curves  as  figure  4.6  but  we have  also
included indifference  curves for the Planner and  the Firm.  The  Firm's
indifference  curves  are  constructed  from  the common  utility  function  which is
maximized,  i.e. the  Firm's  indifference  curves  are constructed  by setting  the
content  of  the  curled  bracket  in  expression  [4.6]  equal  to  a  constant. Further,
the  Firm  has  an  utility  maximizing  combination  of  productivity  and  the  wage;  this
optimal  point  is Or. The  Planner's  optimal  point  is  Op.  As figure  4.7  is  drawn
the  Nash equilibrium  implies  higher  wage and productivity  than  the Firm  would
prefer  and lower  wages  and  productivity  than the  Planner  would  prefer. We see
that  the  Nash equilibrium  implies  solutions  providing  zero  excess  demand  but  a
Figure  4.7
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very low productivity,  i.e. solutions  far away  from the planned production
target.  We also notice  the non-Pareto  optimality  resulting  from playing  the
game  in a non-cooperative  way.  The  bold  curve  in figure  4.7  shows  the  part  of
the  efficiency  locus  Pareto  dominating  the  Nash equilibrium.
We now  derive  the  multipliers  (see  Appendix  4). The  signs  given  below  are
derived  without further  restrictions  on the  parameters  of the model  with the
exception  of dW/dF  where  it is  assumed  that  I is  not too  large. 4'
fi3  0.)  P  aq  (0)  M  1+)  _U  O  1
i:  - fn(at,  ak, B,,  B 2,  P,  n, UM, Uw,  I,  ZpgAn)  [4.11]
The  multipliers  derived  from  the  non-cooperative  model  are  rather  surprising  and
counterintuitive.  Comparing  with eq. [4.5]  we see  that,  among  the  common
multipliers,  only  dW/dP  has the  same  sign. The  results  from  the  nested  game  can
be interpreted  as follows.  Let us start  with the  multiplier  dW/dU4  having  a
negative  sign,  so that  when the  Workers'  threat  point increases  the  wage  will
fall. When  the  Workers  threat  point  increases  the  bargaining  between  the  Workers
and the Manager will lead to lower effort given the wage.'  The  lower
effort/productivity  will lead  to  a  lower  wage  offered  by the  Planner,  this  again
leads  to lower  productivity  and so on until  a new stable  Nash equilibrium  is
reached.  Graphically,  this  process  can  be described  as  a  movement  of the  Firm's
reaction  curve  to the  left.
Another  surprising  result  is  that  an  increase  in  the  wage-bill  tax  results
in  a wage increase,  so that dW/da2  is positive. Several  effects  occur  at the
same  time. The  Manager  is  penalized  for  wage  expenses. Since  the  latter  cannot
determine  the  wage in the  bargaining  with the  Workers  the  only  way the  Manager
can  compensate  for  this  penalty  is  by increasing  the  productivity  (at  the  given
wage).  This corresponds  to a shift  of the  Firm's  reaction  curve  to the  right
(see  figure  4.8).  However a  change  in a%  also influences  the  Planner,  since
(ceteris  paribus)  the  revenue  from  the  wage-bill  tax  will increase  and  hence  an
excess  supply  on  the  goods  market  is  created.  The  Planner  will  respond  by  paying
higher  wages (at  a given  productivity  level).  This corresponds  to  an upward
shift in the Planner's  reaction curve.  The combined  total effect of the
movements  of the  reaction  curves  implies  a  new  Nash  equilibrium  with  higher  wage
and  higher  productivity,  N', in figure  4.8.  The remaining  multipliers  can  be
interpreted  in  a similar  vein.
41  (l+a,)Zf(n)  >  2I is  a sufficient  condition  for  dW/dP  to  be positive.
I  Remember  that  in  this  nested  bargain  the  Workers  and  the  Manager  can  only
settle  on an  effort/productivity  given  a  certain  wage. When  the  Workers'  threat
point increases  they will require  an increase  in their  utility and this is
obtained  by decreasing  their  productivity.  In effect,  the  Workers "vote  with
their  feet".- 31  -
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4.4  Summary
The  above  analysis  has allowed  us to trace  out  some of the implications
of  wage  bargaining  in  the  RlE in  both  cooperative  and  non-cooperative  settings.
The  cooperative  game  inhibits  a  high  degree  of  autonomy  for  the  Planner  and  gave
usual  signs  for the  multipliers.  The  nesting  of the  cooperative  bargaining  in
a  non-cooperative  game is an attempt  to capture  some of the  stylized  features
of an ecornomy  marked by  particular  ownership,  monitoring and  information
constraints. This leads  to a non-Pareto  optimal  outcome  of the game  and many
of the multipliers  have unusual signs.  Clearly a number of other crucial
characteristics  --  such as the presence  of a soft budget  constraint  and its
implications,  in particular,  for the Manager's threat point --  cannot be
adequately  captured  in this  type  of approach. It  should  also  be noted  that  for
the  non-cooperative  setting  the  signs  on the  exogenous  variables  are obviously
sensitive  to  the  sequence  of the  game  and  would  be different  if,  say,  the  Planner
responded  with a wage to a productivity  given by the Manager and Workers.
Finally,  it  is  expression  [4.5]  taken  from  the  cooperative  game  that  will  provide
the  basis  for  the later  empirical  work that  we report  in Section  6.
Section  5:  Wage determination  in  the  Reform  2  Economy
5.1  Introduction
We now present  a very preliminary  outline  of a cooperative  game  between
the  Manager  and  Workers  in a context  where  unemployment  is tolerated,  where  an
emerging  private  sector  exists  but  where  most  of  the  enterprises  are  still  state
owned. In  principle,  soft  budget  constraints  are  no longer  present  and  the  state
firm  is instructed  to act as a  profit  maximizer. However,  it seems  reasonable
to  assume  that  R2E  regimes  are  characterized  by  uncertainty  over  the  rule  changes- 32 v
and  by features  --  including  the limited  size of the jrivate  sector --  that
continue  to  distinguish  them  from  a  more  conventional  market  economy.  The  model
elaborated  below  necessarily  simplifies  and  is  based  on  the  standard  efficiency
bargaining  model  developed  in the  context  of a  capitalist  economy  4.
5.2  A cooperative  game  between  Manager  and  Workers
There  are  two  players,  the  Manager  and  the  Workers. There  is  one  firm
directed  by  the  Manager  and  a  given  number  of  Workers  (m)  seeking  employment  in
the  state  owned  sector.  The  individual  Worker  has  the  utility  function  defined
in  section  3.2. Of the  m Workers  seeking  employment  in  the  state  sector  only
n (nrm)  are  employed. The  effort  delivered  by  Workers  in  the  state  sector  is
assumed  to  be exogenous  and  equal  to  Z.  "  The  utility  for  a  Worker  employed
in the  state  industry  is:
UW  - u(Z)  +  V(W).
Unemployment  amounts  to  m-n. The  utility  for  an  unemployed  Worker  is:
Uw  - u(B)  +  v(O),
where  B denotes  exogenous  unemployment  benefits. Involuntary  unemployment
requires  that  u(Z)  + v(W)  >  u(B) +  v(O).
Using  a utilitarian  formulation  of the  utility  function  ^  for  the  group  of
Workers  seeking  employment  in  the  state  industry  we  have:
Us - nv(W)  +  (m-n)v(B)  +  nu(Z)  + (m-n)u(O)
The  remuneration  of the  Manager  is  formulated  as  in  section  4.2. That  means  that
if  a,  - a2 the  state  firm  actually  acts  as  a  profit  maximizer,  but  other  choices
of  a,  and  a 2 will  induce  other  incentives  for  the  Manager.
The efficiency  locus  is found  as the first  order  conditions  to the
following  problem:
Max ( [UM  - UM][Us - Us]' )  (5.1]
W,n
In  the  R2E  the  threat  point  U8 is  the  remuneration  the  Worker  can  obtain  by  being
employed  outside  the  state  industry.  (5.1]  can  be  rewritten  using  the  specific
4  McDonald  and  Solow  (1981),  Nickell  (1982),  Ellis  and  Fender  (1985).
For  an  excellent  survey,  see  Oswald  (1985).
"  Notice,  n is now endogenous  while  the effort  Z is exogenous. The
explanation  for  the  latter  assumption  is  that  the  Workers  delivering  a  low  effort
are  laid  off  in  the  R2E.
a  This  way  of  aggregating  utility  functions  is  also  used  in  Oswald  (1985)
and  McDonald  and  Solow  (1981).- 33 .
utility  functions:
Max( (a,PZf(n)-a 2 Wn - UM]9[nv(W)+(m-n)v(B)+nu(Z)+(m-n)u(0)  - U8]'. 
W,n
The  efficiency  locus  is  found  in  Appendix  5.  We  have:
a,PZf  (n)  -oaW  v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(0)
Aa  v'  (W)
The interpretation  of the  efficiency  locus  is  as  usual:  the  Manager's  marginal
rate  of  substitution  between  employment  and  wage  shall  equal  (minus)  the  Workers'
marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  employment  and  wage.  Since  v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-
u(O)  >  0  we  have  that  a 1PZfI(n)-%aW  < 0. This  indicates  that  the  Manager  employs
more  labour  than  would  be  the  case  if  the  Manager  was  operating  in  a  competitive
labour  market. As shown  in  Appendix  5 the  slope  of the  efficiency  locus  is
positive.
Static  comparative  analysis  leads  to many undetermined  signs.  The
following  sign  pattern  is  derived  in  Appendix  5.
WI - fn(a,,  %a,  P, m, B, Z,  U.,  U,)
The  three  determined  signs  are  intuitively  sensible.  An  increase  in  the  labour
force  and  hence  in  unemployment  lowers  the  wage. An  increase  in  the  Manager's
threat  point  also  lowers  the  wage,  while  an  increase  in  the  Workers'  threat  point
has the  opposite  effect. The  remaining  multipliers  have  undetermined  signs.
With  respect  to  a,  an  increase  might  be  expected  to  motivate  the  Manager  to  hire
more  workers  and  this  would  increase  the  wage.  Offsetting  this  would  be  the  fact
that the Manager's marginal  remuneration  as  n  increases  would be negative,
motivating  a  lowering  of  the  wage. It  seems  feasible  to  suppose  that  the  former
effect  will  dominate  I  and  this  assumption  would  need  to  obtain  if  dir/da,  and
dW*/dP  are  to  be  positive.  It  is  also  a  sufficient  condition  for  dW/dZ  to  be
positive.  As  regards  dW/da 2, an  increase  in  the  wage-bill  tax  a2  would  lead  the
Manager  to  reduce  the  wage-bill  by  lowering  the  wage.  An  indirect  effect  occurs
if  the  Manager  reduces  employment  --  a likely  outcome  if  a  tax  on  total  wages
is  applied  --  as  this  raises  the  Manager's  utility  at  the  margin  and  hence  could
increase  the  wage.  The  overall  effect  is  indeterminate.  For  dWC/dB,  an  increase
in  unemployment  benefits  raises  the  utility  pf  Workers  seeking  employment  in  the
state  sector.  The  direct  effect  is  a fall  in  the  wage;  the  indirect  effect  is
a  fall  in  employment  which  could  lead  to  a  higher  wage.
5.3  Concluding  remarks
The  model  for  an  R2E outlined  above  illustrates  the  feature  that  since  the
ownership  of most  of the  enterprises  still  belongs  to the state  it can  be
expected  that  the  management  of  these  will  be  carried  out  following  rules  from
I  This  means  that  2(ajPZf'(n)-a 2W)f'(n)  > a,PZf  I(n)f(n). See  Appendix  5.- 34  -
the  Rlv..  If  these  rules  stress  a  high  productiont  (a,  is  large)  it  is  likely  that
a  high  wage  will  be  the  outcome.  Unemployment  is  in  this  model  correlated  with
the  size  of the  labor  force,  m, and  will  tend  to  lower  the  wage  in the  R2E.
Finally,  if  the  Workers  have  good  income  possibilities  in  the  private  sector
their  threat  point  will  be  large  leading  to  upward  wage  pressure  in  the  state
sector.
However,  the  R2E  regime  raises  a  host  of  other  interesting  questions  which
we  are  unable  to  address  adequately  using  the  above  model.  Among  other  issues
that  need  to  be  tackled  will  be the  differences  between  the  preferences  of  the
union/worker  group  as  bargainer  with  private  employers  and  as  an  employer  in  its
own right.  The outcomes  of that  bargaining  with  respect  to the  wage and
employment  are  not  however  obvious,  particularly  given  the  overlay  of  structural
change  imposed  on  the  system  by  the  transition  to  an  R2E  regime.
SectLmi  6:  Some  Preliminary  Emixical  ReIsults
6.1  Introduction
We  now  present  in  very  preliminary  form  results  from  estimations  of  the
equation  derived  from  the  cooperative  game  setting  for  the  RlE regime  (see
Section  4.2). To  that  end  we  use  quarterly  data  from  both  Hungary  and  Poland
covering  the  periods  1982(1)-1989(2)  and  1982(l)-1989(4)  respectively  47.  Over
that  time  both  systems  could  be  stylized  as  RlE  economies.  The  expression  with
which  we  work  is  repeated  below;
W+  I  (+)  M  X0  L)
- fn(a,,  o%,  P, n,  Um,  Uw)
The  parameter,  a,,  relates  to the  incentive  for  enhanced  production.  A rough
approximation  for  this  incentive  could  be  planned  or  realized  productivity.  a 2
covers  the  wage  bill  tax. P  is  producer  prices.  In  section  4  the  Workers'  and
the  Manager's  expectations  to  the  consumer  prices  were  ignored  --  we  choose  now
to include  consumer  prices  in  our  empirical  analysis;  n is  employment. The
manager's  threat  point  UM  depends  on  the  manager's  alternative  income  sources
(see  also  section  4.2),  and  the  workers'  threat  point  Uw  relates  to  the  workers
income  possibilities  for  example  in  the  private  sector.  For  the  set-up  presented
below,  however,  current  data  limitations  have  forced  us  to  drop  a  number  of  terms
and concentrate  in effect  on the association  between  wages,  prices  and
productivity.  We  also  incorporate  simple  error  correction  terms  in  the  estimated
equations.  The  following  notation  is  used  throughout;
47  Data  are  taken  from  the  IMF  International  Financial  Statistics  and  are
more  fully  described  in  Appendix  6.° 35  -
WAGE  - index  for  average  earnings.
CPI  - consumer  price index.
PPI  - producer  prices  for  the  industry.
INEMP  - index  for  industrial  employment.
INPDN  - index  for  industrial  production.
PRO  - index  for  industrial  productivity  (INEMP/INPDN).
L (as  prefix) - natural  logarithm  of  variable.
D  (as  prefix)  - first  difference  of  variable.
D4 (as  prefix)  - fourth  difference  of  variable.
ECMH  - correction  term  for  Hungary  (LWAGE-LCPI).
ECMP  - correction  term  for  Poland  (LWAGE-LPPI-LPRO).
DUM<i> - dummy  for  period  i.
6.2  Hungary
First  difference  changes  in  wages,  prices  and  productivity  presented  in
Figure  6.1  pick  out  some  particular  features  of the  wage  and  price  setting.
Wage  changes  appear  clusteree  in  the  first  quarter  up  to and  including  1985,
therafter  an annual  wage round  appears  absent  with changes  more randomly
distributed  over  the  year. Intra-annual  wage  adjustments  appear  to  have  been
adopted  as  an  institutional  routine  associated  with  the  acceleration  in  consumer
prices  over  the  later  period.  Consumer  and  producer  price  changes  mostly  track
each  other  closely,  with  some  discrepancy  at  the  start  of  the  period.  Again,
there is a  consistent  first quarter  clustering  of price changes.  For
productivity  (measured  over  the  socialist  material  sector)  changes  are  generally
concentrated  in  the  second  and  fourth  quarters.  The  spike  in  the  fourth  quarter
can  in  part  be  explained  by  the  structure  of  the  wage  round  and  the  use  of  the
wage  tax  to  associate  the  wage  and  productivity  paths. Reported  productivity
increases  in  the  fourth  quarter  likely  reflect  the  incentive  structure  with  a
tax-based  wage  policy. In  short,  there  are  clear  institutional  features  that
yield  particular  regularities  in  the  movement  of  the  basic  variables.
Table  6.1  reports  the  descriptive  statistics.  Several  features  stand  out.
First,  there  is  effective  real  wage  stability  over  the  period,  as  indicated  by
the  similarity  in  the  mean  of  DLWAGE  and  DLCPI.- 36  -
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There  appears  to  be an indexation  of wages  to  prices  . The  correction
term  ECMH  --  a  real  wage target  --  is  subsequently  adopted  in the  estimation  1.
Consumer  and producer  prices  have an expected  coefficient. However,  wage and
price  changes  are  apparently  very weakly  correlated. The  negative  correlatlon
between consumer  prices and productivity  can be explained  by the seasonal
features  alluded  to above.  The productivity  term is also marked  by negeative
serial  correlation,  as indicated  by the  high DW statistic.
Table  6.1
Sample  range: 1983(1)  - 1989(2); number  of observations:  26
Series  Mean  S.D.  Maximum  Minimum  DW
DLWAGE 0.0245742  0.0351654  0.1183435  -0.0284606  2.192672
DLCPI  0.0235934  0.0251316  0.0966929  -0.0053410  2.513085
DLPPI  0.0148701  0.0344912  0.0945788  -0.0419526  2.132274
DLPRO  0.0078998  0.0403732  0.076r547  -0.0723430  3.172487
Covariance  Correlation
DLWAGE,DLCPI  0.0000035  0.0041205
DLWAGE,DLPPI  0.0003322  0.2848057
DLWAGE,DLPRO  0.0004286  0.3139611
DLCPI,DLPPI  0.0005617  0.6739663
DLCPI,DLPRO  -0.0002263  -0.2319340
DLPPI,DLPR0  0.0000690  0.0515244
The estimation  presented  in Table 6.2 relates  wage changes  to consumer
prices,  productivity,  a one lag correction  term and dummies  for 1984(4) and
1988(1). The  constant  is  suppressed;  its  inclusion  exerted  little  effect  on  the
coefficients  and  their  standard  errors  1.  The size  of price  and productivity
coefficients  enter  with  roughly  the  same  magnitudes  as  for  market  economies  while
the correction  term suggests  a  rapid adjustment  speed.  There is a clear
underlying  relationship  linking  price,  productivity  and  wage  changes. However,
the  equation  is  clearly  under-identified  and  lacks  adequate  stability.  This  can
be attributed  in  part  to the  institutional  features  of the  economy  and the  many
changes  over this period  in those arrangements. Nevertheless,  a  reasonably
robust  conclusion  would  be that  wage formation  has  marked  endogenous  attributes
and that  the  wage does  not enter  as a purely  exogenous  variable.
4  More fully  explored  in  Commander  and  Coricelli  (1990).
4  The correction  term is an observed relation  between  wage and price
variables  during  the  1980s  and  is  not  to  be interpreted  as  a  long  run  equilibrium
relationship.
a0 See  Appendix  6 for  actual  and fitted  values  as  well as residuals.- 38 -
Table  6.2
Dependent  Variable  is  DLWAGE
Sample  range: 1983(1)  - 1989(2); number  of observatiorns:  26
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD. ERROP  T°STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
DLCPI  0.7908919  0.1673248  4.7266867  0.000
DLPRO  0.3075491  0.1237486  2.4852732  0.021
ECMH(-l)  -0.6369975  0.1410623  -4.5157170  0.000
DUM844  -0.0635518  0.0252779  -2.5141279  0.020
DUM881  -0.0733555  0.0295827  -2.4796703  0.022
R-squared  0.603610  Mean of dependent  var  0.024574
Adjusted  R-squared  0.528107  S.D.  of dependent  var  0.035165
S.E.  of regression  0.024157  Sum  of squared  resid  0.012254
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.811326  F-statistic  7.994525
Log likelihood  62.68714
6.3  Poland
First  difference  changes  for  wage,  prices  and  productivity  are reported
in  Figure  6.2. The  pattern  of  wage change  is  clear;  adjustment  is in the  first
quarter  with the exception  of 1987(1)  5'.  Producer  price changes exhibit  a
similar  first  quarter  pattern  with consumer  price  changes  clustered  generally
in the  second  quarter. Productivity  also exhibits  first  quarter  spikes  with a
deceleratiou  over the last eight quarters  of the  sample.  For  both wages and
prices,  there  are  sharp  accelerations  toward  the  end  of  the  period,  particularly
from  1989(2)  onward  as  a  set  of  upward  adjustments  to  administered  prices  occurs
and  the  economy  enters  into a short  high inflation  period.
Tne descriptive  statistics  presented  in Table 6.3 indicate  a  high and
predictable  correlation  between  wage  and  price  changes,  particularly  for  producer
prices. The  mean  of  wages is somewhat  lower  than  of the  cons'tmer  prices  while
the  sum  of  the  producer  price  and  productivity  variable  almost  equals  the  mean
for  the  wage.  This  motivates  the  insertion  of a  correction  term  relating  wages
to production  values  (LUAGE-LPPI-LPRO).  It should  also  be noted that the  low
DW point  to  non-stationarity  in some  variables,  particularly  consumer  prices.
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Table  6.3
Sample  range:  1983(1)  - 1989(4); number  of observations:  28
Series  Mean  S.D.  Maximum  Minimum  DW
DLWAGE  0.1031135  0.1352018  0.4486949 -0.0153958  1.164384
DLCPI  0.1165299  0.1880734  0.9145840 -0.0054556  0.316326
DLPPI  0.0870261  0.1242070  0.4987389  0.0000000  1.358728
DLPRO  0.0108672  0.0280915  0.0927196 -0.0444890  1.724336
Covariance Correlation
DLWAGE,DLCPI  0.0177138  0.7224306
DLWAGE,DLPPI  0.0148153  0.9149054
DLWAGE,DLPRO  0.0009634  0.2630659
DLCPI,DLPPI  0.0169464  0.7523111
DLCPI,DLPRO  -0.0008803 -0.1727925
DLPPI,DLPRO  0.0009282  0.2758756
The  estimation  reported  in  Table  6.4  relates  wage  changes  to consumer  and
producer  prices,  productivity,  a  dummy  being  1  for  all  quarters  of  1987,  and  the
correction  term  '.  The  constant  is suppressed. The first  quarter  adjustment
structure  for  the  key  variables  prompts  fourth  differencing  of  the  data. Unlike
for  Hungary,  both consumer  and producer  prices  enter  jointly  and  significantly
and their coefficients  sum to near unity.  Producer  price increases that
translate into consumer price  increase appear to  have direct and  full
transmission  through  to the  wage.  The  productivity  term  has a rather  high
Table  6.4
Dependent  Variable  is  D4LWAGE
Sample  range:  1983(1)  - 1989(4); number  of observations:  28
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
D4LCPI  0.3745738  0.1421613  2.6348511  0.015
D4LPPI  0.6178990  0.2258889  2.7354108  0.012
D4LPRO  0.6408179  0.2495559  2.5678332  0.017
ECMP(-4)  -0.8597551  0.2577528  -3.3355802  0.003
DUM87  -0.0976912  0.0286817  -3.4060427  0.002
R-squared  0.975054  Mean of dependent  var  0.342996
Adjusted  R-squared  0.970716  S.D.  of dependent  var  0.303656
S.E.  of regression  0.051964  Sum  of squared  resid  0.062105
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.461380  F-statistic  224.7482
log  likelihood  45.82553
'  See  Appendix  6 for  actual  and fitted  values.- 41  -
coefficient.  While  the  fit  is  reasonable  for  the  period  1984-1987,  the  residuals
for 1988/89  suggest inclusion  of dummies.  Their insertion  did not however
materially  improve  the  performance  of the  estimation.
6.4  Concluding  Comments
Both the Hungary  and Poland  estimations  presented  above represent  very
preliminary  attempts at modelling wages in RlE  regimes.  Data and other
limitations  mean that the equations  are  evidently  under-identified.  The wage
variable  itself  may  not capture  components  of  wage income  committed  to  workers
under  other  titles. These  factors  naturally  limit  the  conclusions  that  can  be
derived.  Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  in  both  economies  wage  changes  have  been
strongly  associated  with  prices  and  somewhat  less  with  productivity  suggesting
that wages should not be taken as strictly  exogenous.  More satisfactory
empirical  investigation  presupposes  the construction  of new series allowing
inclusion  of the  full set  of variables  denoted  in  expression  4.5  above.
Section  7: onclusion
This  paper  has addressed  the  issue  of how wages  are formed  in socialist
economies.  It has done so on the basis of a number of  stylized  regimes
characterized  by their  degree  of decentralization  and introduction  of market-
based features  or rules.  The paper shows that one  'traditional  treatment
involving  a  strong  assumption  of  exogeneity  for  the  wage  is  not  warranted. Both
the  classical  planned  economy  and  the  partially  reformed  regime  (RlE)  are  faced
with the  joint problem  of motivating  workers  in the absence  of conventional
penalties --  particularly unemployment --  and of monitoring effort.  The paper
indicates  the manner in which these  regimes  attempt  to resolve  the incentive
problem.  For  the  CPE the  piece-rate  mechanism  is applied. We show  how under
cooperative  and  non-cooperative  settings  the  outcome  can  be either  lower  than
desired  productivity  or higher than warranted  wages.  The RlE regime  can be
interpreted  as an attempt  to refine  the  motivational  structure  by introducing
another  player,  the  manager. One  underlying  objective  is  to  provide  a framework
where  workers  and  managers  engage  in  a cooperative  game  to determine  wages  and
output  with the  incentive  structure  in  effect  given  by the  Planner. We attempt
to show  how  this can  yield  other-than-intended  results  if  workers  and  managers
cooperate,  playing  a  non-cooperative  game  with  the  Planner.  This  type  of  outcome
might broadly typify recent Polish experience  over the 1980s.  From the
bargaining  model that  we set  up in Section  5.2  we derive  an equation  that can
be estimated  for  the  RlE  regime  and  some  preliminary  results  are  reported. The
assumption  of exogeneity  is shown  to be untenable,  even if institutional  and
other  factors  indicate  a greater  degree  of  exogeneity  than  would  be the  case  for
a standard  market  economy.- 42 -
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AnuendIS  1:  The  Dictatorial  soluation  ia  She  CPE
Multipliers
To simplify  the  expression  the  following  notational  simplifications  are
made for  Appendix  1 and  2; the  stars  indicating  the  optimal  value  are  dropped;
Wb  - Wb., and  Zp  - Zpw.
The  wage as  a  function  of  the  base  wage
To find  dW/dWb  we use  the Implicit  Function  Theorem  (IFT). Define  F as:
F  - u(Zp)+v(W/P)-u(0)-v(Wb/P)
From equation  (3.91  In section 3.3  we have that the  wage for the Dictatorial
solution  is  W implying  F  - 0.  From  IFT,  the  multiplier  dW/dWb  is given  as:
dW  dF/dWb  - v'(Wb/F^)(l/P)
dWb  dF/dW  V  (W/t)  (  /r)
dW  v'(W/P^)
- _  >  0
dWb  v° (W/r)
If  we  use  vw < 0, then  v'(Wb/P)  > v'(W/P) and  hence  dW/dWb  > 1.
The  wage  as  a function  of the planned  productivity
dW  dF/d7Zp  uI (Z)
_  m  - _  -
dZp  dF/dW  vI(W/")(11P)
dW  u'(ZP)
_  . p  s  > O
dZp  v'  (W/PF)
The  wage as  a function  of  price  expectations
dW  dF/d^  v'(W/pe)(-W/Po)  - v'(Wb/PE)(Wb/e)
dPF  dF/dW  VI Mr)(1/t)
We get  after  simplification:- 45  -
dW  v'(WI/r)(W/P  )  - v'(Wb/P  )(Wt/P')
dr  v'  (WMr)
dW/dr cannot  be signed  because  of two opposite  effects  as the result of an
increase  in P.  The real  value  of the  whole salary  (W)  decreases  which tends
to increase  the  wage.  On the  other  hand, the real  value of the  base wage Wb
decreases  such that the alternative  (to deliver zero effort  and receive  Wb)
becomes  less  attractive. The  combined  effect  is  uncertain.
Th-  wage as a function  of the  Planner's  threat  point
Up  does  not  appear  in  F  and  hence  dW/dUp  - 0.
AD1endix  2:  The  non-cooperative  Same
Slope  of the  Workers'  reaction  curve
As argued  in section  3.4  the  reaction  curve  can  be  backward  sloping,  i.e.
the  reaction  curve  constitutes  a correspondance  and  we can  not  use  IFT  straight
away.  However,  as a first  step  we can  find the  elope  of the inverted  reaction
function. This  means  we are  now going  to find  dZ/dW  (instead  of dW/dZ);  using
the  Chain  Rule  we have:
dZ  dZ  do
dW  da dW
dZ/do  can  be found  from  the implicit  form  of the  reaction  curve  (eq. (3.111  in
section  3.4):  1
F  - u'(Z)  +  v9((Wb..+aZ)/PO)(a/P6)  - 0
Using  IFT  gives  us:
dZ  dF/da  v"(W/P*)(ZIPe)(aIPe)  +  v'(W/PO)(L/P)
do  dF/dZ  u"(Z)  + v"(W/P')(a/Pp) 2
The denominator  is always  negative,  while the numerator  can be positive or
negative.
a  We  generally use the notation F  for the function  used to derive
multipliers  via the  Implicit  Function  Theorem.  The  F  used in this  appendix  has
no relationship  to the  F  used in appendix  1.- 46  -
The  piece-rate  is  a  - (W-Wb)/Z.  This  gives  the  derivative  da/dW  - I/Z. We can
find  the  slope  of the  inverted  reaction  curve  for the  Workers.
dZ  v"(W/P)(Z/P@)(a/P)  + v'(W/P@)(1/1')  I
dW  u"(Z)  + v"(W/PO)(a/P)2  Z
Again the denominator  is negative,  while the numerator can be positive  or
negative.  If the term  v"(W/P')(Z/P')(a/P')  is smaller  than v'(W/P)(1/P) the
numerator  is positive  and dZ/dW is hence  positive.  If vt(W/P)(Z/P)(air*)  >
v'(W/PO)(1/P)  the  inverted  reaction  curve  is  downward  sloping.  Since  we have  no
a priori  knowlodge  about  v" we cannot  sign the  numerator  and  hence  we cannot
determine  the slope of the inverted  reaction  curve. In the figure  below an
example  of a  possible  reaction  curve in an inverted  'effort  - wage' space is
drawn.
z
Workers'  reaction  curve
Wt..W
Multipliers  for  the  Stackelberg  equilibrium
We know that  the  Planner  chooses  the  smallest  piece-rate  which  satisfies
equation  (3.13]  in  section  3.4. This  means  that  the  Planner  will always  choose
a  wage (and  effort)  on the  upward  sloping  parts  of the  reaction  curve. However,
the upward  sloping  parts on the original  reaction  curve  will also be upward
sloping  on  the  inverted  reaction  curve. This  means  that  only  the  upward  sloping
parts of the inverted  reaction  curve are of interest.  As argued  above,  the
inverted  reaction  curve  slopes  upward  when  v"(W/P)  (Z/P)  (a/PI)  < v'(W/P)(l/P).
Therefore,  when  we calculate  the  Stackelberg  equilibrium  we  know  that  it  is  going
to  be found  where  v"(W/P')(Z/P@)(a/Pe)  <  v'(W/P")(1/P).
However,  as illustrated  above,  we can  say  very little  about  the  behavior
of the  reaction  curve,  and  by just  considering  the  upward  sloping  parts  of the
reaction curve we  very easily risk working with overlapping "pieces" of
continuous  functions. To  avoid  this  we assume  that  the  second  order  derivative- 47 -
of v is upward  sloping,  that  is  vm >  0.  This condition  secures  that  the
inverted  reaction  curve  will  be  bell-shaped,  i.e.  the  original  reaction  curve
will contain  only one bend.  This again means that the part where
v"(W/P)(Z/P`)(v/P`)  < v'(W/Pr)(l/Pr)  will  be  a  continuous,  differentiable,  and
upward  sloping  function.  The  intersection  between  the  Worker's  reaction  curve
and  the  Planner's  Zp,  line  will  then  be  unique  and  we  can  find  it  just  by  using
IFT  (on  equation  (3.13]).
The  wage  as  a  function  of  the  base  wage
The (total)  wage  is given  as:
W - Wb +  OZp
We  have:
dW  da
_  1  +  - z
dWb  dWb
To find  da/dWb  we use IFT on equation  (3.13J. From equation  [3.13]  we have
that  the  function  Fp  defined  below is  equal  zero.
F-  uI(Z.) + v'((W+aZp)/PI)(a/P)  - 0
Using  IFT  we find  the  multiplier  da/dWb  as:
do  dFp/dWb  v"(W/P)  (  /P)  (alp")
dWb  dFp/da  v"(W/P^)(ZM/P)(a/p)  +  v'(W/P)(l/r)
We insert  the  expression  for  da/dWb  into  the  formula  for  dW/dWb  and obtain:
dW  v'  (W/P)  (1/P)
dWb  v"  (W/P") (Zp/Pr) (O/P")  + v'  (W/r)  (l/P)
Since  v" < 0 we have that  dW/dWb  > 1.
The  wage as a function  of the  planned  productivity
Again  using the  Chain  Rule:
dW  do
_~  _  Zp  + a
dZp  dZp- 48  -
To find do/dZp  we use IFT:
do  dFp/dZp  u"  (Zp)  + v" (W/P)  (/P)  (/P*)
dZp  dFp/dr  V"(W/P)(Z4/r)(0/P)  +  v'(W/r)(l/r)
We insert  da/dZp  into  the  expression  for  dW/dZp:
dW  u"(Zp)  +  v"(W/r)  (C/rP)(a1/)
_  - . zp  +  o
dZp  v" (W/r)  (ZP/r)  (alp")  +  v ' (W/r)  (l/r)
dW  v'(W/r)(q/r) - un(Zp)Zp
_  ,  . . ~~~~~~~>  O
dZp  v"(W/r)(ZP/PO)(o/r)  +  v'(W/P)(l/P)
The  vage  as a function  of the  price  ezpectations
dW  dO
dPr  dr
da  dFp/dP  v"(W/P)(-W/P)(a/lp)  +  v'(W/p)(-o/p2)
dPr  dFp/da  v"  (W/P)  (ZP/P)  (a/p)  + v (W/P)  (l/P)
We Insert  in  formula  for  dW/dP and  get  after  simplification:
dW  dFp/dPr  v"(W/p*)(_W/Pd)(a/r)Zp  +  V'(U/p6)(_a/p)Zp
dPe  dFp/dG  v"(W/P1)(Z,/r)  (a/PI)  + v  (W/P) (1/P^)
We cannot  sign  the  multiplier  dW/dP.
ApvendiS  3:  The  cooperative  game  In the  RIE
The  efficiency  locus
The  NZH solution  to the  cooperative  game is given  by:
t~i (  [a,PZf(n)-a°Wn  - UM]([u(Z)+v(W)  - Uw]' 
For computational  ease we take the logarithm  of the  expression  in the curled
brackets.  We differentiate  with respect  to W and Z and  obtain  the following
first  order  conditions:- 49 -
-a 2n  v'(W)
e  +  (l-e)  - o0
a1PZf(n)-a%Wn  - UM  U(Z)+V(W)  - UW
a,pf(n)  u'(Z)
e  +  (1-e)  - o
a,PZf(n)-%aWn  - UM  u(Z)+v(W)  - UW
By isolating  the  denominator  for the  first  fraction  in the  first  equation  and
inserting  it into  the second  equation  we get that the  efficiency  locus  can  be
written as:
a,  Pf(n)  u'M
- ~~  m  -
a2  n  v'(W)
Slope  of efficiency  locus
Let  us  write  the  equation  for  the  efficiency  locus  in  a  somewhat  different
way and  call the  expression  on the  left  hand  side  F.
F  - a,Pf(n)v'(W) + %anu'(Z)  - 0
Using  IFT  we have  the  following  expression:
dW  dF/dZ  %anu"(Z)
dZ  dP/dW  a,Pf(n)v"(W)
Since  both  the  second  order  derivatives  are  less  than  zero  (cf.  section  4.2)  we
have that  dW/dZ  c 0.
Change  of wage-bill  tax
dW  dF/d%a  nu'(Z)
d4,  J  dF/dW  a,Pf(n)v"(W)
The  denominator  is,  as  before,  negative;  the  numerator  is  negative  and  the  whole
expression is negative.
Multipliers
The first  order  conditions  for  the  Nash bargaining  solution  can also  be
found  without  taking  logs  of  the  utility  gain  function  first. By  differentiating
the  expression  in  the  curled  bracket  in [4.41  with  respect  to  W and  Z  we get  the
following  first  order  conditions:- 50  -
F.  (  t,PZf(n)-% 2 Wn  -UM]V(W)  - a2 n(u(Z)+v(W)  - UW]  - 0
FZ  - c,tPZf(n)-a 2Wn - M1u'(Z)  +  c1Pf(n)(u(Z)+v(W) - Uw]  - 0
Subscript  W respective  Z denotes  that the  objective  function  is  differentiated
with respect to W  respective  Z.  Let us call the Manager's gain from the
bargaining  6M, 
6M  - a,PZf(n)-%aWn  - UM,  and  the  Workers'  gain  6w,  8w  - u(Z)+v(W)  -
UW.  Using  this  notation  the  above  system  can  be  written  as:
Fw  - 6MV'(W)  - oan6w  0  °  .
Fz  - SMu'(Z)  +  al1Pf(n)6w  0  °
We can find the  multipliers  via IFT for a set  of simultaneous  equations.  The
multipliers  dW/dai  and  dZ/da,  can  be found  from  the following  syst9mg
(dFw/dWIEdW/dcz]  +  [dFw/dZJ(dZId(xJ  - (dFw/da, 1
[dFz/dW][dW/da,]  +  [dFz/dZ][dZ/da 1 8  - [dFz/dall
The solutions  to this  system  can  be found  using  Cramers  Rule:
dW  [dFw/dZ1[dFz/da 1 - (dFz/dZ1fdFw/da,]
dai  tdFw/dW](dFz/dZ]  - (dFw/dZ][dFz/dW]
dZ  tdFz/dWJ[dFw/daI1  - (dFw/dW3(dFz/da,c
de4  [dFw/dW]ldFz/dZ]  - (dFw/dZ]ldFz/dWJ
Call the common denominator  D 3. From the second order conditions  for the
maximization  problem  we know  that  D 3 - (dFw/dW]  [dFz/dZ]  - (dFw/dZ] 2 >  0 (as  well
as dFw/dW  <  0 and  dFz/dZ <  0).
For convenience  we calculate  the  partial  derivatives  for  later  use:
dFw/dW  - -2a2nv'(W)  +  6wv"(W)  <  0
dFw/dZ  - a,Pf(n)v'(W) - a2nu'(Z)  - 2C1Pf(n)v'(W)  - - a 2nu'(Z)
(dFw/dZ  - dFz/dW  > 0.  The  last  two  equality  signs  are  derived  using  the  condition
for  the  effeciency  locus).
dFz/dZ - 2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)  +  6Mu"(Z) <  0
Let  us first  look  at the  impact  of the  exogenous  variables  on the  wage.- 51  -
dW/df,  - (1/D 3)( [dFz/dW][dFw/dXi]  - [dFz/dZ][dF/dal])
- (1/D 3)( [2c,Pf(n)v'(W)][PZf(n)u'(Z)  +  Pf(n)6w]
- [2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)  +  6mu"(Z)J[PZf(n)v'(W)]  4
(1/D 3)( 2a,Pf(n)v'(W)u'(Z)  - 6mu"(Z)PZf(n)v'(W)  )  >  0
dW/da2  - (1/D3)( [dFz/dW][dFw/doa2  - (dFz/dZ][dFz/dQ]1
- (1/D 3)( [2c,Pf(n)v'(W)][-Wnu'(Z)l
- (2aiPf(n)u'(Z)  + 6mu"(Z)J(-Wnv'(W) - n6w] )
- (1/D 3)( 2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)n6w  +  6mu"(Z)[Wnv'(W)  +  n6w] )  <  0
dW/dP  - (1/D3)(  (dFd/dW][dFw/dP]  - [dFz/dZ][dFz/dP]  )
- (1/D 3)( (2a 1Pf(n)v'(W)ICa,Zf(n)u'(Z)  +  a,f(n)6w]
- (2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)  +  6mu"(Z)]falZf(n)vI(W)]
- (1/D 3)( 2c,Pf(n)v'(W)a,f(n)6w  - 6u"(Z)alZf(n)v'(W)  )  >  0
dW/dn  - (1/D 3)( [dFz/dW][dFw/dnl  - [dFddZ][dFz/dn]
- (1/D3) (  [2ctPf(n)v'  (W)  j [,PZf  '  (n)u'(Z)  +  a,PfI(n)6w]
- [2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)  +  6mu"(Z)][((rlPZf'(n)-q2W)v'(W)  - %6w]
a  (1/Da)(  2a,Pf(n)v'(W)aPf'(n))w  +  2acPf(n)u'(Z)oa[Wv  (W)+6w3
- 6Mu"(Z)f(alPZf'(n)-oaW)v'(W)  - q2 6w]
dW/dn  has undetermined  sign.
dW/diUm  - (1/D,)(  [dFz/dW][dFw/dUm]  - [dFz/dZ][dFz/dUc]
- (1/D 3)( (2a,Pf(n)v'(W)][-u'(Z)]
- [2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)  +  Smu"(Z)J[-v'(W)] )
- (1/D 3)( 2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)v'(W)  )  <  0.- 52 -
dW/dUw  - (l/D.)(  (dFz/dW][dFw/dUW]-  [dFz/dZJfdF/dUw]
- (1/D3)(  (-q2nu'(Z)J[-a 1Pf(n)3
- [2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)  +  Smu"(Z)1a[n]1
- (l/D 3)l  - anmu" (Z)  )  >  0.
We  calculate  how  the  o  dtLvitx  Z  depends  on  the  incentive  parameters
a  and  a:
dZ/dzt  - (1/D3)(  [dFz/dW][dFw/dC,J  - [dFw/dW][dF 2 /dj]  I
- (1/D3)(  1-qnu1(Z)][PZf(n)v'(W)]
- [-2qanv'(W)  +  6wv"(W)I[PZf(n)u'(Z)  +  Pf(n)6w]
- (1/Do)  (  2a2nv'(W)Pf(n)6w  - Jwv"(W)HPZf(n)u'(Z)+Pf(n)6wl 1
dZ/da1 has  undetermined  sign.
dZ/dM 2 - (1/D3)(  [dFz/dW] dFw/da]  - [dFw/dWI[dFz/d42]j
- (1/D3)(  [-q2nu'(Z)j[-Wnvm(W) - n6w]
- [-2Ganv'(W)  +  Ewv"(W))[-Wnu'(Z)  I
- (1/D3)( a2nu'(Z)n6w  +  6wv"(W)Wnu'(Z) )  < 0.
AaRendix  4:  A cooneritive  gsAme  nested  in  i  non-C  or5at1L  gft
The  Firm'e  reaction  curve
If  we  take  logs  to  the  content  of  the  curled  bracket  in  [4.63  and
differentiate  with  respect  to  Z  we  get:
-ct,Pf  (n)  u'SZ)
+  -0
a,PZf(n)-oWn  - u(Z)+v(W)  -
This  can  only  be simplified  a  little;  we  obtain  the  reaction  curve:
a,Pf(n)  a,PZf(n)-&aWn  -
u'(Z)  u(Z)+v(W)  - Uw
The  first  order  condltion  for  the  Flrm  can  also  be  written  as:
FF  - C 1tPZf(n)-q.Wn  - Um1u'(Z) + *,Pf(n)[u(Z)+v(W)  - Uw]  - 0- 53  -
The second  order condition  for a maximum requires  that dFF/dZ  <  0, which is
satisfied. To aimplify  the  notation  we call  the  Manager's  utility  &ain 6m,  6m
- a,PZf(n)-qWn-Ufm,  and  the  Workers'  utility  gain  6w9  8w - u(Z)+v(W)-UW.  Fp  can
then  be written  as:
FF  -MU  '(Z)  +  - 1 Pf(n)6W  - 0
To find the  slope  of the  Firm's  reaction  curve  we use  IFT:
dW  dFF/dZ  a,Pf(n)u;(Z)  +  6mu"(Z)  +  a,Pf(n)u'(Z)
dZ  dFF/dW  -%nu'(Z)  +  a,Pf(n)v'(W)
dW  2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)  + 6Mu"(Z)
dZ  2nu'(Z)  - a,Pf(n)v'(W)
Both numerator  and  denominator  are  negative,  so dW/dZ  is  positive. The  Firm's
reaction  curve  is  upward  sloping.
The  Planner's  reaction  curve
We differentiate  the  content  of the  curled  bracket  in  expression  (4.8]
in section  4.3. We obtain:
Fp  - -2(1-a,)Bln(PI-(1-',)PZf(n)+(l-%)Wn3  - 0
This can, provided  (1-%)B 1n . 0,  be simplified  to equation  14.9]  in section
4.3.
Multipliers
At the Nash equilibrium  both the Firm's and the Planner's  reaction
curves are satisfied  at the same time.  (The intersection  between the two
reaction  curves  is the  NE).
The Firm's  and the  Planner's  reaction  curves:
FF  - LMu  (Z)  +  a,Pf (n)6w  - 0
Fp  - -2(1-%)Bln[PI-(1-a 1 )PZf(n)+(l-ca)Wn]  - 0
We have  two  simultanous  equations.  As in  Appendix  3  we use  IFT  and  Cramer's  rule
to obtain  the following  formula  for the  multiplier  showing  the  change  in  W as
a,  changes.- 54 
dW  [dFF/dZJjdFPz/da, 1 - (dFp/dZ3(dFF/da, 1
dal,  [dFF/dW][dFp/dZ]  - (dFF/dZl(dFp/dW]
Call the  denominator  D40  that is,  D4 - (dFF/dWJ(dFp/dZJ  - [dFF/dZjCdFp/dW].  Let
us sign  this expression.  For the  NE to be stable  (and  unique)  we require  that
the  slope  of  the  Firm's  reaction  curve  is  bigger  than  the  slope  of the  Planner's
reaction  curve. The  slope  of the  reaction  curves  can  be found  using  IFT  on  the
equation  for FF  and Fp.
Slope  (Firm's  reaction  curve)  > Slope  (Planner's  reaction  curve)
(dFF/dZ]  (dFp/dZ]
(dFF/dW]  [dPF/dWJ
(dFF/dW][dFp/dZ]  - dFF/IdZH[dFp/dW]  < 0.
The  denominator  D4 must  be negative  for  the  NE to be stable.
For  convenience  we calculate  the  partial  derivatives  for later  use:
dFF/dZ - 2a,Pf(n)u'(Z) + 6Mu"'(Z) c  0  (Firm)
dFa/tZ - 2(1-a,)(I-%)B,nPf(n)  >  0  (Planner)
Let  us look  at the  impact  of the  exogenous  variables  on the  wage.
dW/dI,  - (1/D 4){  [dFF/dZ3(dFp/dajj  - (dFp/dZ](dFF/da,l  }
- (1/D 4 ){  t2aPf(n)u'(Z)+&yu'(Z)][-2(1-a2)3,nPZf(n)]
- (2(1-cl)(1-a 2)B,nPf(n)][PZf(n)u'(Z)+Pf(n)6w]  }
a  (1/D 4){2(1-a 2)3,nPf(n)}
(  -(1+a,)PZf(n)u'(Z)  - Z6Mu"(Z)  - (1-a 1)Pf(n)6w  )
dW/da,  cannot  be signed.- 55  -
dW/d4  - (1/D 4)(  (dFp/dZ][dFp/dM2]  - [dFp/dZ1[dFF/da
(1/D 4)( (2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)+6mu"(Z)j[2BtnX  +  2(1-qg)B,nWn]
- [2(1-a 1)(1-a)8,nPf(n)][-Wnu'(Z)I  )
- (1/D 4)( 2(l-)2)B,n 2 W)((lfa 1)Pf(n)u'(Z)+5uu"(Z)  )  >  0.
dW/dB,  - (1/D4)(  [dFF/dZ](dFp/dB,]  - (dFp/dZ][dFF/dBiJ )
- (1/D 4)( [2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)+6muu(Z)][-2(1-a2)nX]  )  - 0.
Excess  demand  is  always  zero.
dW/dI6  is  zero  since  S2  does  not  occur  in  neither  Fp  nor  FF.
dW/dP  - (1/D4) (  [dFF/dZ][dFp/dP]  - [dFp/dZ][dFF/dP]  )
- (1/D4)(  [2atPf(n)u'(Z)+6mu"(Z)](2(1-4)Bln(Zf(n)-I)]
- [2(1-al)(1-a2)8,nPf(n)J[a,Zf(n)u'(Z)4a,f(n)5wI
- (1/D4 )(  2(1-aa)Bln)(2a,Pf(n)u'(Z)(Zf(n)-I)+8mu"(Z)(Zf(n)-I)
- (1-a,)Pf(n)a,Zf(n)u'(Z)-(l-a 1)Pf(n)a 1f(n)6w  )
- (1/D 4)(  2(1-2)B 1 n)(  a,Pf(n)u'(Z)[(1+a 1)Zf(n)-2I]
+  6mu"(Z)(Zf(n)-I)  - (l-a,)PZ(n)a,f(n)6W]
A  sufficient  condition  for  dW/dP  being  positive  is  that (14*,)Zf(n)-21  > 0.
dW/dn  - (1/D 4 )(  [dFF/dZ][dFp/dn]  - [dFp/dZ][dFF/dn]  )
- (1/D 4)( (2a¶Pf(n)u'(Z)+6mu"(Z)][-2(1-2)B¶n(PZf'(n)-(l-a,)W]
- [2(1-ai)(1-a2)B,nPf(n)][(a,PZf'(n)-a4W)u'(Z)+a,Pf(n)Sw1  )
dW/dn  has undetermined  sign.
dW/dUm  - (l/D 4)(  [dFF/dZ][dFp/dUmj  - [dFp/dZ][dFF/dUM  )
- (1/D 4)(-  [2(1-a,)(l-ak)B,nPf(n)](-u'(Z))  )
- (1/D 4)( 2(l-a,)(l-a 2)BjnPf(n)u'(Z)  )  >  0.- 56  -
dW/dUw  - (I/D.)(  [dFF/dZ1[dFp/dUw]  - [dFp/dZ1[dFF/dUw]
°  (1/D4)(  - [2(l-a 1)(l-a2)B,nPf(n)][-alPf(n)]  )
- (1/D4)(  2(1-aj)(l-a)BjnPf(n)alPf(n)  )  <  0.
dW/dI  - (l/D 4)( (dFF/dZ][dFp/dIj  - [dFp/dZ][dFp/dI]  )
- (l/D 4)( [2csPf(n)u'(Z)+6uu"(Z)][-2(l-oi)8in(-P)]  <  0.
A&Mendix  5:  A coooeratLve  Same in the  R2F
The  efficiency  locus
The  NZH solution  is the solution  to the  following  problem:
jax(([a,PZf(n)-aaWn  - UM]9[nv(W)+(m-n)v(B)+nu(Z)+(m-n)u(0)  - UeP)
We take logs of the expressions  in the curled  brackets,  differentiate  with
respect  to  W and  n, and  obtain:
-a 2n  nv  (W)
e  o  +  (1-0)  _
a1PZf(n)-a2Wn  - Um  nv(W)+(m-n)v(B)+nu(Z)+(m-n)u(0)  - Us
-tjPZf  I(n)  -a,?W  v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(0)
e  +  (1-0)  -o
a,PZf(n)-a2Wn  - U.  nv(W)+(m-n)v(B)+nu(Z)+(m-n)u(O)  - U 8
C 1PZf ' (n)  -a2W  v(W) -v(B)+u(Z)  -u(O)
V'(W)
The slope of the efficiency  locus can be found using IFT if we write the
condition  for  the  efficiency  locus  this  way:
F  - (ajPZf'(n)-a2W)v'(W)  +  a2(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(O))
dW  dF/dn  aQPZf"(n)v'(W)
dn  dF/dW  a2v'(W)  +  (a,PZf'(n)-a 2W)v"(W)  +  a2v'(W)- 57 -
dW  a1PZf"(n)v'(W)
_  _  *  >  0
dn  (t,PZf'  (n)  -a 2W)v"(W)
The  efficiency  locus  is  upward  sloping.
multipliers
The  first order conditions for  the  Nast.  bargaining solution  leave two
simultaneous  equations.
Fw-  - ans  +  6mnv'(W) - 0
F.  (a,PZf'(n)-UW)68  + 6m(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(0))  - 0
The  Manager's  gain  from  the  bargaining  is  6m - aPZf(n)-q2Wn  - Um  and  the  Workers'
gain  is 69  - nv(W)+(m-n)v(B)+nu(Z)+(m-n)u(0)  - Us.
IFT  for  two  simultaneous  equations  gives  the  multiplier:
dW  [dFw/dn][dFA/dCl1  - (dF./dn][dFw/da,]
da1  [dFw/dW  ([dFn/dn]  - [dFw/dn  [(dF./dW]
The denominator  is called D5 and is positive  according  to the second  order
conditions.
We calculate  the  partial  derivative  needed  in all  the  multipliers.
dFw/dn  - - M8s  - a2n(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(0))  +  (a,PZf'(n)-o%W)nv'(W)  +  6mv'(W)
- 2n(CtPZf'(n)-%W)v'(W)  - - 24n(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(0))
dF,/dn  - a,PZf"(n)69  +  2(a,PZf'(n)-2W)(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(O))
_  a,PZfn(n)68s  - 2(l/%)(a 1 PZf'(n)-q2W) 2vI(W)
- a,PZf"(n)69  - 2o(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(O)) 2(l/v'(W))
These  derivatives  have  been simplified  using  the  first  order  condition  for  the
Nash  bargaining  solution  and the  condition  for  the  efficiency  locus.
dW/da,  - (l/Do)(  [dFw/dn][dF./da,]  - (dFf/dn][dFw/dai]
- (l/D 8)( [2n(a 1PZf'(n)-q2W)v'(W)]
[PZf'(n)66  +  PZf(n)(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(0))]
- [a,PZf-(n) 8s v  2(1/a 2)(a,PZf'(n)-oW) 2v'(W)][PZf(n)nv'(W)]
- (1/Do)(  2n(a,PZf'(n)-%W)v'(W)]PZf'(n)69  - a0PZf"(n)6 8PZf(n)nv'(W)  )- 58 -
(1/Da)(  nv'(W)PZ8s)(2(a,PZf'(n)-a2W)f'(n)  - a,f"(n)PZf(n)
dW/da 1 >  0 if  2(a,PZf'(n)-o%W)f'(n)  >  a,f  "  (n)PZf(n).
dW/daa  - (1/D 5)( [dFw/dn][dFdd4]  - [dF./dn][dFw/da] 
- (1/D 5)( [2n(a 1PZf'(n)-%W)v'(W)][-W6 8 - Wn(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(O))J
a[,PZfn(n)6 6 - 2(1/a,)(a,PZf'(n)-a2W) 2v'(W)][-n6 8 - Wnnv'(W)]
- (1/De)(  -2n(a,PZf'  (n)-%W)v'  (W)W6S  +  @1PZf"(n)6s[n6s+Wnnv  (W)]
- 2(1/2)(ajPZf'(n)-QaW)2vl(W)n6 8 )
ajPZf'(n)-aoW  >  4W  is a sufficient  condition  for  dW/d42  <  0.
dW/dJJa,  - (1/Do) {  dFw/dnl[dFn/dUM]  - [dFn/dnl[dFw/d(l  )
- (I/Da)(  [2n(t,PZf'(n)-a2W)v'(W)][-(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(O))I
[  (a 1PZf"(n)69  - 2(1/oh)(G 1PZfE(n)-a2W)gv"(W)][-nv'(W)]
- (1/Do)  C,PZf"(n)6Snv'(W) <  0
dW/ZdU  - (l/Do)  ( (dFw/dnI  [  dF./dUg]  - [dF./dn]  (dFw/dU 8s I
- (1/Da)(  (2n(a,PZf'  (n)-a2W)v'(WU)]  [-(a,PZf'  (n)-a2W)]
a,  (PZf'n(n)66  - 2(1/c,)(t,PZf'(n)-ahW) 2v'(W)][-a 2n(-1)]
- (l/D 5)( -a 1a2PZf"(n)n6S  )  >  0
dW/dP  - (l/D.)  (dFw/dn]  [dF./dP]  - (dFf/dn  dFw/dP]  I
- (1/Da)(  [2n(a 1PZf'(n)-a 2W)v'(W)]
[a,Zf  (n)Sg  + a,Zf(n)  (v(W)  -v(B)+u(Z)  -u(O))]
- [a,PZf"(n)6s  - 2(l/o)(a 1PZf'(n)  -2V)'v'(W)]fa,Zf(n)nv  (W)]
- (l/Do)(  2n(a 1PZf'(n)-a 2W)v'(W)]a,Zf'(n) 6g - Ck,PZf"(n)6ea,Zf(n)nv  (W))
dW/dP  >  0 if 2(ajPZf'(n)-a 2W)f'(n)  >  a,f"(n)PZf(n).- 59  -
dW/dm  - (11D 5)( (dFw/dnl[dFn/dml  - [dF"/dn](dFw/dm]  )
- (1/Da)(  [2n(a,PZf'(n)-a 2W)v'(W)3[(a,PZf'(n)  + a2W)(v(B)-u(O))J
- [a,PZf"'(n)6s  - 2(1/a 2)(a 1PZf'(n)-a2W) 2v'(W)](-an(v(B)-u(O)I
- (1/D5){  a1a 2PZf''(n)n6S(v(B)-u(O)  )  c  0.
dW/dB  - (1/D5)(  [dFw/dn][dFi/dB]  - [dFn/dn]3dFw/dB]  )
- (l/D.)(  [2n(a 1PZf'(n)-%aW)v'(W)]
((C 1PZf'(n)-a2W)(m-n)v (B)  +  6M(-V'  (B))]
- (a1PZf''(n)6 8 - 2(1/a 2)(a1PZf'(n)-oW) 2v'(W)][-a2n(m-n)v'(B)]
- (GMD){  -2n(a 1PZf'(n)-%aW)v'(W)6Mv'(B)  +  ,PZf"(n)6Sa2n(m-n)v'(B)  )
dW/dB  >  0 if 2(a,PZf'(n)-a2W)  >  (m-n)a 1pzf''(n).
dW/dZ  - (1/Do){  (dFw/dn](dF"/dZ3  - CdFn/dn][dFw/dZJ  }
- (1/D 5){ [2n(a,PZf'(n)-a 2W)v'  (W)J
[a,PZf'(n)68  +  (a 1PZf'(n)-t 2W)nu'(Z)
+  a1PZf(n)(v(W)-v(B)+u(Z)-u(O))  +  6uu'(Z)J
- [a,PZf"(n)6 8 - 2(1/a2)(a 1PZf'(n)-a 2W)V'  v(W)J
(-a2nnu'(Z)  + a,Pf(n)nv'(W)J  )
- (l/D5){  2n(a,PZf'(n)-a 2W)v'(W)a,Pf'(n)6 8 - a,PZf"(n)6sa 1PZf(n)nv'(W)
+  2n(ca,PZf'(n)-a 2W)v'  (W)6Mu'(Z)  - a1PZf"(n)6M2nnu'  (Z))
2(a 1PZf'(n)-a2W)f'(n)  > alf"(n)PZf(n)  is a sufficient  condition  for  dW/dZ  being
positive. If  there  was no disutility  associated  by delivering  a higher  effort
u'(Z)  would  be zero  and  the stated  condition  would  be a necessary  condition.
Appendlx  6t Preliminary  empirical  results
Date
The data printed below are from the IMF, International  Financial
Statistics. The Hungarian  data is extracted  from  the  database  IMFGES  in BESD
up  to  Sept.  1990.  The Polish data is from IMFGES and the GUS Bulletin
(Statistical  Office,  Warsaw).  The employment  index  for Poland  before 1985 is
based on a yearly  series  from IMF IFS adjusted for seasonal variation  using
estimates  for  the  period,  1986(1)  - 1989(4).- 60 -
Legend  (for  both  countries)
WAGE  - index for average earnings.
CPI  - consumer price index.
PPI  m  producer prices for the industry.
INEMP  - index for industrial employment.
INPDN  - index for industrial production.
Hungary
obs  WAGE  CPI  PPI  INEMP  INPDN
1982.1  0.817021  0.781467  0.892857  1.036720  0.950820
1982.2  0.818440  0.799846  0.854037  1.038880  0.973588
1982.3  0.812766  0.823429  0.847826  1.037800  0.930783
1982.4  0.784397  0.828660  0.864130  1.032400  0.962659
1983.1  0.837589  0.847112  0.944876  1.008640  0.950820
1983.2  0.857447  0.853103  0.906056  1.012960  0.982696
1983.3  0.857447  0.866523  0.895186  1.014040  0.950820
1983.4  0.837589  0.873712  0.907609  1.018360  0.979053
1984.1  0.900709  0.921399  0.977484  1.001080  0.994535
1984.2  0.921986  0.931943  0.944876  1.007560  1.004550
1984.3  0.909929  0.944884  0.944876  1.011160  0.958106
1984.4  0.884397  0.939851  0.943064  1.015120  1.010930
1985.1  0.969503  0.987778  1.000000  0.997840  0.997268
1985.2  0.999291  0.993769  1.000000  1.002160  1.012750
1985.3  0.995745  1.006230  1.000000  1.003240  0.989071
1985.4  1.031210  1.012460  1.000000  1.006480  1.000910
1986.1  1.046100  1.045770  1.041000  0.993521  0.995446
1986.2  1.084400  1.041460  1.029000  0.995680  1.051000
1986.3  1.081560  1.055600  1.011000  0.995680  0.989071
1986.4  1.082980  1.068060  1.000000  0.998920  1.012750
1987.1  1.116310  1.105440  1.043000  0.975162  1.027320
1987.2  1.154610  1.126770  1.056000  0.973002  1.075590
1987.3  1.178720  1.163670  1.063000  0.967603  1.000000
1987.4  1.222700  1.182600  1.063000  C.969762  1.081970
1988.1  1.193620  1.302660  1.095000  0.947084  1.036430
1988.2  1.230500  1.299540  1.096000  0.943844  1.063750
1988.3  1.292200  1.338370  1.109000  0.941685  0.987249
1988.4  1.454540  1.361370  1.119000  0.944924  1.057380
1989.1  1.451000  1.489190  1.230000  0.918000  1.021000
1989.2  1.486000  1.530330  1.272000  0.910000  1.042000
m^,.  ""  . "  ..  mmmm.__  .. i  n._  _.,,..._.,.  w  .61  -
Poland
obs  WAGE  CPI  PPI  INEMP  INPDN
1982.1  0.543000  0.524000  0.652000  1.021840  0.843000
1982.2  0.539000  0.626000  0.652000  1.018810  0.849000
1982.3  0.538000  0.650000  0.652000  1.021780  0.838000
1982.4  0.575000  0.672000  0.652000  1.022000  0.858000
1983.1  0.720000  0.729000  0.752000  1.011840  0.932000
1983.2  0.709000  0.785000  0.752000  1.008810  0.922000
1983.3  0.701000  0.785000  0.752000  1.011780  0.909000
1983.4  0.734000  0.803000  0.752000  1.012000  0.914000
1984.1  0.781000  0.845000  0.861000  1.004840  0.971000
1984.2  0.793000  0.902000  0.861000  1.001810  0.969000
1984.3  0.795000  0.919000  0.861000  1.004780  0.959000
1984.4  0.834000  0.914000  0.861000  1.005000  0.964000
1985.1  0.913000  0.938000  0.963000  0.999846  0.978000
1985.2  0.953000  0.996000  0.969000  0.996810  0.990000
1985.3  0.953000  1.017000  0.979000  0.999780  0.986000
1985.4  1.000000  1.042000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000
1986.1  1.124000  1.096000  1.126000  1.004000  1.029000
1986.2  1.151000  1.164000  1.130000  1.000000  1.044000
1986.3  1.150000  1.169000  1.144000  1.000000  1.033000
1986.4  1.211000  1.225000  1.178000  1.002000  1.042000
1987.1  1.279000  1.301000  1.409000  1.004000  1.054000
1987.2  1.378000  1.467000  1.418000  0.999000  1.079000
1987.3  1.378000  1.523000  1.439000  0.998000  1.068000
1987.4  1.470000  1.591000  1.492000  0.997000  1.075000
1988.1  2.147000  1.866000  2.028000  0.990000  1.133000
1988.2  2.188000  2.273000  2.142000  0.984000  1.149000
1988.3  2.297000  2.458000  2.233000  0.983000  1.130000
1988.4  2.704000  2.700000  2.384000  0.981000  1.127000
1989.1  4.182000  3.274000  3.432000  0.977000  1.169000
1989.2  4.722000  4.204000  3.751000  0.969000  1.159000
1989.3  6.587000  7.034000  4.528000  0.972000  1.112000
1989.4  10.31700  17.55500  7.456000  0.963000  1.096000~~~~~~0  .................
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